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THE EASTERN QUESTION 1822 TO 1842

by

Milton Rieta Gutsch

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
BACHELOR OF ARTS**

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

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PREFACE

The Egyptian question (1821-1842) is of such a complicated nature, has so many different aspects from which it may be viewed and finally is so intimately connected with the history of Europe during the same period, that it is impossible to understand it thoroughly without an introduction that is somewhat more elaborate and more detailed than at first thought may be expected. The introduction briefly describes the economic conditions of Europe, Turkey and Egypt at the outbreak of the Greek revolution, gives a short summary of political events bearing on the Eastern Question from Waterloo to Navarino, and finally sets forth a survey of Mehemet Ali's life up to the time of the Sultan's appeal for Egyptian aid to put down the Greek revolt. This chapter therefore serves as the background, of the thesis proper.

The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of the Greek revolt with particular attention to the diplomatic questions involved and the growing dependence of the Sultan on his vassal Mehemet Ali. Incidentally it attempts to show Russian designs on Turkish territory, the attitude of the other powers towards Russian aggression, the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Egypt in the circle of powers as seen by the superiority of Mehemet Ali's troops over those of Mahmoud II.

The third chapter takes up Mehemet Ali's social and

economic reforms, his ambitious plans for independence, his invasion and conquest of Syria and the final arrangement at Kutayah which made him a formidable rival of the Sultan as the head of the Mohammedan world.

The fourth chapter contains a somewhat detailed and (it is hoped) accurate account of the diplomatic struggle over the Egyptian question from the "Treaty of Kutayah" to the "Treaty of the Straits." Particular attention is paid to the rivalry between England and France in the Levant, the European fear of Russian aggression and aggrandizement and the reactionary attitude of Austria and Prussia.

The conclusion contains a brief speculative account of the results on the later development of the Eastern problem, had the great powers at this time assumed a different attitude. The conclusions drawn may not be accepted in their entirety but the general result will, it is hoped show the great importance of the Eastern Question in 1840, a fact which many historians have (it seems) so greatly underestimated.

In the spelling of proper names the form that is most commonly used among English writers has been accepted. Thus the name of the Pasha of Egypt has been variously spelled Mehmed,¹ Mohammed,² Muhammad,³ and Mehemet.⁴ But the latter form has been accepted in this thesis.

1) Prokesch-Osten

2) Holroyd

3) Transliteration into English

4) Paton, Cammeron, C. M. H., Debidour, Cadalvene, Blanc, etc.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Napoleon by his preeminence and by his far reaching designs, for almost twenty years gave unity to the history of Europe. This unity did not disappear immediately after the downfall of its progenitor. The opposition had been bound together too closely for too long a time by the bonds of self preservation to allow any violent break or even rapid relaxation. Affairs in Europe also were in a condition too unsettled to warrant any vital change in the policies of the great powers. A battle was even then being fought between the forces of reaction and those of liberalism in which reaction at first had the better of the fight.

The ministers at the helms of the great European governments had been brought up in an atmosphere of absolutism and were closely connected with each other in propagating their reactionary doctrines. The only government which, in view of its future history might have been expected to oppose " reaction " was England. But Castlereagh was secretary of foreign affairs. He belonged to a party which identified duty with the principle of hostility to change and thus no liberal program could be expected to emanate from the British government. The Czar Alexander in Septem-

ber 1815 organized the reactionary forces of Continental Europe into a system called the Holy Alliance. Prince Metternich immediately took the leadership and a short time later brought about the formation of the Quadruple Alliance, pledged to the principles of the preservation of every "legal institution," as Metternich called the monarchical system of Europe, and to the extermination of all liberal movements. For several years it was a most powerful factor in determining European history. It was triumphant on the Continent, at Troppau, Laybach and Verona over Sardinia, Naples and Spain respectively. By its influence and active interference it suppressed liberalism wherever it was discovered. It met its first serious defeat when the United States and England prevented its attempt to restore monarchical control in South America. The opposition of Great Britain had become clearer when Canning became minister of foreign affairs. It is claimed by some that he was the chief cause of the downfall of the Holy Alliance.¹ Metternich's system met another check in the affairs of Greece. Finally the defection of France in 1830, and the attitude of England in the Belgian troubles inflicted a blow on this "European system" from which it was never able to fully recover. Yet in spite of this, its influence on European affairs was noticeable as late as 1848. The Quadruple as

1) Stapleton, "Canning" Vol. I, p. 134.

well as the Holy Alliance were especially important in determining the attitude of some of the powers towards Greece and Egypt, while they were in revolt. This combination influenced Austria's policy in particular, throughout the whole period under discussion. More indeed than any other government was she interested in checking the national and liberal movement" which threatened at once her internal organization and her influence in Germany."¹ If she could have maintained her policy, Greece no doubt would have secured her independence. Austria was ^{not} powerful enough to ~~do~~ ^{prevent} this; still there can be little question that because of her reactionary ideas, Austria prevented any further disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

If we turn to the East of Europe we discover an extraordinary situation. Turkey was in an almost hopeless condition. It was apparently on the brink of ruin. The causes for this state of affairs were inherent in the Ottoman government itself. Of all the states of Europe, the Ottoman Empire probably had the least unity, either religious, physiological or ethnographical. It had fewer elements necessary to the composition of a nation than any other state in existence. The ruling race, the Osmanli Turks, constituted a minority of the total population, even in the regions actually under the control of the Sultan. The only section in which they were numerically dominant was the 1) Seignobos, "History of Europe since 1815," p. 8.

interior of Asia Minor. In spite of their long continued occupation and rule in the territory comprised within the Ottoman boundaries, unlike the barbarian invaders of the Western Empire, the Ottoman^s had never been absorbed, or succeeded in absorbing the peoples they had conquered;¹ and their rule continued as that of an invader encamped upon foreign soil.² Professor Freeman ascribes this to the inherent, irreconcilable differences, between the conquerors and the conquered. There was no unity of race, customs, history, language or religion between the Turks and their subjects and there could never be a union of peoples.*

When the Ottoman conquest of the Balkan peninsula was accomplished in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it was already peopled by Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Servians, Bosnians, Herz¹¹övinians, Montenegrins, Roumanians, Moldavians and Wallachians. These people practically remained distinct throughout the period of the Ottoman rule, having

 *) Professor Freeman brings out this point in chapter II, by comparing Eastern Europe with Western Europe. "In the Ottoman Empire, he says - " the Christian subject does not wish to reform the Turkish government; he does not wish to reconstruct it after the model of some other government, he simply wishes to get rid of it altogether. He is not a member of the Turkish political community; for while he is under the power of the Turk, he stands outside all political communities. Nor does he wish to become a member of a Turkish political community, for he is not a Turk as his countrymen. What he wishes is to become a member of a political community of his₃ own nation, which shall have nothing to do with the Turk.

 1) Freeman, " Ottoman Turks in Europe " Ch. III.

2) C. M. H. Vol. X, p. 170.

3) Freeman, " Ottoman Turks in Europe " Ch. II, p. 177.

in common only a bitter hatred towards each other and in particular towards their conqueror.

The Turks in general during the early part of their rule, assumed quite a tolerant attitude towards the local populations; they never, however allowed them equality. No Mohammedan government ever has given or can give real equality to its subjects of other religions.¹ To the Turk, government consists merely in the maintenance of his supremacy and the collection of tribute, and if these are not resisted he is contemptuously satisfied.² The rayahs (the Christian population) enjoyed the freedom of their belief and usages, suffering however disqualification for civil and military service. For these rights and privileges they paid tribute in money and children; but the latter form after some time was abolished, although the Sultan's famous Janissary troops had been recruited from these "tribute children". The provinces themselves were well administered up to the death of Sulāman the Great (1566) but after that their government depended upon the local Pasha who had almost absolute power. So long as he paid the tribute to the Sultan he was not interfered with. This tribute was derived from taxation. The taxes were farmed out at the very beginning and usually fell heavily upon the peasantry, most of whom did not even own their own land.

1) Freeman, " Ottoman Turks in Europe " p. 58

2) Dugan, " Col. Univ. Series " Vol. XIV, No. III, p. 15.

After 1566 this tolerant attitude was abandoned and one of suppression substituted. "The rural inhabitants of Greece," says Duggan,¹ "experienced to the full extent Turkish oppression, and their history from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century is almost a blank." The lot of the Slavonic inhabitants was as bad. "Bulgaria lying helpless and hopeless immediately behind Adrianople, from the beginning resigned itself to oblivion and oppression."² The Servians farthest removed from the central government, which could not control the local officials, were for a large part a prey to the organized brigandage of Janissary rebels.³ Only the Montenegrins and the Albanians in the Western Balkans were able to withstand the Turks, the former by their valor, the latter with the aid of their mountainous fortresses.

Conditions in Northeastern Africa and Asiatic Turkey were not a bit better. In Egypt the Mamelukes reigned supreme with their systematic oppression of the native population and of the traders. Syria was a veritable hotbed of religious and political unrest. The Druzes, the Mutawalis, the Nusairiyeh, the Maronites and the Ismailis hated each other as much as their rulers. In Arabia, the Beduins and Wahhabyys were both only nominally under the rule of the Sultan.

Bearing in mind this heterogeneous population, it is

1) Duggan, "Col. Univ. Series" Vol. XIV, No. III, p. 18.

2) Ibid 22.

3) Ranke, "History of Servia" Ch. III.

not to be wondered at that these different peoples of the Ottoman Empire, restless by nature, longing for independence, imbued with a bitter hatred for their rulers, retaining in their minds with the hopes of vengeance the memory of long series of oppressive measures, should revolt as soon as capable leaders presented themselves and when other conditions were favorable. Such an opportune moment existed after the Napoleonic wars. The administration was weak; the reforms of Selim III and Mahmoud II had met with disapproval in various parts; the central government was corrupt and unstable; the army was in an exceptionally bad condition; the French revolutionary doctrine had penetrated the Balkans and kindled anew the embers of nationality and liberty. Russia and Austria were greedily watching affairs, prepared to benefit by any insurrection. Thus the crucial moment of Turkey was at hand. The "sick man of Europe" seemed to be taking his last breath when the empire was shocked by a series of revolts which would have put an end to Turkey had not Europe interfered.

In the Balkans, if the Bulgarians were in partial submission since the death of Paswan-Oghlou nevertheless Bosnia still questioned the Sultans' authority. In Albania the power of Ali of Janina was still unbroken. The Christian populations, encouraged by a few successes, were aspiring to emancipation. The Servians under Miloš wrested

concessions from the Sultan, which gave them almost complete autonomy. The Montenegrins, independent in fact, in their little kingdom, hoped to enlarge it. Moldavia and Wallachia had seen their privileges not only confirmed but extended by the treaty of Bucharest and were still unsatisfied. The Hellenic world was on the verge of its great struggle for independence. In Asia Minor Paswan--Oghlou, Pasha of Ouscote had established a kingdom from which the Sultan could not displace him. The Pashalik of Bagdad had achieved practical independence. In Arabia the Egyptian troops under Ibrahim were still struggling with the Wahhabys; Algeria and Tunis were Turkish provinces only in name. In short every Pasha, who felt himself strong enough, refused¹ either taxes or tribute to the Sultan. But the great danger, the danger which although not the most imminent yet assumed the gravest and most forbidden aspects was the rapid rise of the powerful vassal state of Egypt under the rule of Mehemet Ali.

Such conditions only awaited a man to render them fully significant. This man was Mehemet Ali. His early life is obscure. He was born in Cavalla, a small seaport

1) Dennis, " Eastern Problems " p. 162.

on the frontier between Thrace and Macedonia, not far from the site of Philippi.¹ On that point all the historians agree, but not so as regards the date of his birth. Mehem-et Ali himself said he was born in the same year as Napoleon and Wellington (1769); but he was never able to prove his claim.² He came from good Albanian stock, his father having been a respectable yeoman of the district.³ He was left an orphan at an early age under the care of a well to-do uncle upon whose death a short time after, he was adopted by the village mayor.⁴ From childhood he showed indomitable energy,⁵ a hankering after trade⁶ and great personal courage. In Macedonia, he traded in tobacco and probably made a small fortune. He early displayed his love for order and respect for law when he distinguished himself as a tax collector and rural gendarme among the lawless population of the neighborhood.⁷ The mayor appreciated these good points and appointed him captain of the local guard,⁸ and gave him his daughter to wed by whom he had three sons - Ibrahim, Ismael and Toussoun. This is about all that we know of his life up to 1800. Some of the French writers claim that it was this early period which inspired him with a love for France, brought about by his acquaintance and

1) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 39.

2) Brehier, " L'Egypte de 1798 à' 1900 " p. 83.

3) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 39.

4) Brehier, " L'Egypte de 1798 à' 1900 " p. 83.

5) Ibid p. 84.

6) Paton, " Egyptian Revolution " Ch. II, p. 2.

7) Cameron " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 39.

8) Brehier, " L'Egypte de 1798 à' 1900 " 85.

commercial dealings with an agent from Marseilles at Cavalla. But there is no historical proof offered for the assertion; and we mention it only as a possible explanation for his later French inclinations.

It was in 1800 that Mehemet Ali first appeared in the land over which he was destined to rule for almost half a century. Napoleon was sweeping everything before him in Egypt when the Turkish government set about organizing an army for a counter invasion. A vizirial letter was sent to the Chorbaji (Mayor) of Cavalla, instructing him to raise a force of 300 Bashi-Bazuks.¹ The mayor complied and sent his quota with his son at the head and Mehemet Ali as second in command.² to the port of embarkation. Before the contingent arrived at its destination however, the senior officer suffering from illness yielded his command to Mehemet. It was this small force which made up part of the army which Napoleon almost annihilated at Abukeer by driving it into the sea. Mehemet Ali and a few others, as chance willed it, were saved from drowning by being hauled into the gig of Sir Sydney Smith.³ In 1801 he again made a landing on Egyptian soil, this time in conjunction with the British under Abercrombie and in the ensuing campaign he distinguished himself in the march on Cairo, having been the first to enter Rahmaieh held by the French

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- 1) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 41.
 2) Brehier, " L'Egypte de 1798 à 1900 " p. 85.
 3) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 42.

under General Lagrange.¹ It was thus by this strange combination of circumstances that Mehemet Ali gained his first foothold in the land of which he was soon to be the absolute ruler.

But the English immediately after the peace of Amiens withdrew their troops from the land of the Pharaohs. Egypt now once again took on its earlier characteristics. Among these was the rule of the Mamelukes, who outside of Cairo were masters of the provinces. The Sultan desirous of seeing his authority restored and this unruly and lawless set of semi-barbarians exterminated began an active campaign against them. This campaign was inaugurated by an act of treachery so common to oriental history. By the order of the Capitan Pasha, the principle beys of the party of Murad were lured into a trap and brutally murdered almost to a man. The Mamelukes now seeing on what weak ground they stood, prepared to withstand any further attempts against their independence. All the advantages lay with them. First, they had gained a practical knowledge of warfare from their battles with the French and had learnt the lesson of maintaining strict discipline and fighting in modern military formations; then they were far better acquainted with the ground on which the battle was to be fought; and finally their name carried more prestige in Egypt than that

1) Paton, " Egyptian Revolutions " Ch. II, p. 2.

of the Sultan.¹ It was this struggle which was to be so advantageous to Mehemet Ali. Khusrev who was to play a great part in the affairs of Turkey became Governor of Egypt in July 1801. Mehemet Ali had already become his favorite.² Observing the wishes of the Sultan, Khusrev immediately dispatched an army against the Mamelukes; the expedition, however ended disastrously and Mehemet Ali was blamed for the defeat.³ From this point began the implacable hatred between these two historic figures which was to last up to their death and play such an important part in the history of Eastern Europe. To add to Khusrev's^S misfortunes the troops soon revolted because of arrears of pay and the Governor was forced to flee for his life. Tahir, the leader of the insurgents succeeded but soon met a like fate leaving Mehemet Ali supreme in Cairo. From this point up to 1805 when Mehemet Ali became Pasha of Egypt, Egypt was in a condition of anarchy. Ali Gezayarli, Osman Bey el Bardissy, Mohammed Bey Elfy, and Kurchid all appeared on the scene to seize the reigns of government, but Mehemet Ali by a series of opportune alliances with the various factions, first with one and then with another, crushed all his rivals. To make his position more secure he made an appeal to the third estate by his condemnation of exorbitant exactions

1) Paton, " Egyptian Revolution " Ch. II, p. 2.

2) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 54.

3) Malortie, " Egypt " p. 31.

and by the preservation of order in Cairo. Consequently on May 14, 1805 this conservative faction of Cairo elected him Pasha by acclamation pending the decision on the Porte. At the same time they sent a petition to the Sultan laying before him their grievances and begging him to confirm their appointment. Their prayers were granted and in July 1805 a firman arrived formally instating Mehemet Ali in the office of Pasha of Egypt.

Meheemet Ali's position although greatly improved was not yet absolutely secure. In the first place the Porte feared him and planned his removal; and in the second place the Mamelukes were still very powerful. In July 1806 the Porte had sent Mehemet a notice of his transference to the Pashalik of Salonika. The troops would not hear of the removal and the merchants fearing a return to the chaotic condition preceeding Mehemet Ali's rule, sent another address to the Sultan begging the retention of their Pasha. The French consul Drovetti used his influence to attain the same end and in November 1806 Mehemet Ali was finally confirmed in his position.

England, however being at war with Turkey as an ally of France, was dissatisfied with the reconciliation and hoped to restore the old Mameluke power.¹ In 1807 an expedition of 8000 men was fitted out which disembarked in

1) Malortie, " Egypt " p. 36.

Egypt on May 7 under the command of General Fraser. After two crushing and ignominious defeats administered by the troops of Mehemet Ali they were driven back to their boats and set sail for other lands.

Certain of his office for at least some time, as far as the central government was concerned, Mehemet Ali was in a position to turn his attention to the remnants of the Mamelukes in the provinces. In 1810 he directed an expedition against the beys of Upper Egypt and on the 24th of August 1810 completely dispersed them.¹ But even this was not sufficient. Nothing less than total extermination would satisfy him. To achieve this object he invited all of the surviving Mamelukes to participate in a procession in honor of Toussoun's departure against the Wahhabys. They accepted the invitation and formed in the line of march. At a given signal the gates of Cairo were closed and the whole band was horribly massacred. It was not until then that Mehemet Ali felt secure.

Mehemet Ali understood thoroughly that the only way to preserve his independence was to make conquests. He did not then entertain the idea of overturning the old edifice of the Ottoman empire or of obtaining from the Sultan legal autonomy.² He said to Prokesh-Osten " Do you know what dismemberment of Turkey would mean to me?" Every Mussulman would avoid me with horror; my own son would be the first

1) Brehier, " L'Egypte de 1798 a' 1900 " p. 99.

2) Ibid

to abandon me.¹" He recognized the fact that the bonds connecting Egypt with Turkey, weak as they were, were sufficiently strong to preserve it from European interference. He wished to maintain this relationship until his deeds warranted independence. Up to that time it was his policy to support the Sultan.

Such an occasion soon offered itself. A sect of reforming Moslems had risen in central Arabia who in a few years had become so powerful as to successfully withstand the troops of the Sultan. They were independent in everything but name. The founder of the sect was Mohammed - ebn- abd - el -Wahhab a fanatic reformer born in 1695.² His doctrines consisted of a return to the primitive usage of Islamism as taught by Mohammed, the duties enforced being fasting, prayer, almsgiving and pilgrimage to Mecca with a strict prohibition of stimulating liquors, tobacco, luxuries, usury, gambling etc.³ Through this asceticism he

1) Prokesh, Oston, " Mehemed Ali " p. 12.

"Sie sind ein Fremder, mit der Denkweise eines Muselmannes unbekannt und für Ihren Auftrag nicht verantwortlich, wer aber gibt Ihnen Cabinete des Recht, mich in meinen Hause zu beleidigen? Wissen Sie, welge Folge die Zertrummerung des Reiches für mich haben würde? Jeder Muselmann trate mit Abschau vor mir zurück. Mein Sohn ware der Erste mich zu verlassen. Der Sultan ist ein Narr und ein Thor, aber Gott hat ihn uns gegeben unserer Sünden wegen."

2) Brehier, " L'Égypte de 1798 à 1900 " p. 126.

3) Paton, " Egyptian Revolutions " p. 37.

won many followers among the Beduins.¹ Finally a native chieftain, Saoud by name, believing he could increase his territories by spreading the propaganda of the reformer, adopted his beliefs and protected him in his principality.² On his death he left a strong patrimony to his son Abdul-Azig. This one (1765-1787) succeeded in conquering the whole of central Arabia. His son Saoud II continued the expansive policy. In 1803^{he} entered Mecca and a short time later, Medina. His puritanic policy in the cities alienated the people who were anxiously looking for a deliverer. His high taxation of caravans ruined all commerce in southern Arabia, while his ill treatment of the pilgrims and his partiality shown to the Arabs caused the cessation of the pilgrimages.

It was with this sect then, " who fought with the traditional courage and dash of early and uncorrupted Islam"³ that Mehemet Ali was ordered to contend. Mehemet Ali in fear of his turbulent Albanians, welcomed the war as an opportunity to rid himself of them. He organized an army of 8000 men under the command of Toussoun and sent them against Medina where they were repulsed with heavy losses. Not discouraged however, he gathered another force and by a series of brilliant victories regained Mecca and Medina,

1) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 98.

2) Ibid p. 99.

3) Dennis, " Eastern Problems " p. 162.

while his fleet held the Arabian ports. He offered liberal bribes to the local chiefs and encouraged local trade, thus making the war pay for itself. At this crisis, the Wahhabys lost their gallant leader, Saoud, by death and their fortunes soon began to decline under the rule of his successor Abdullah. Toussoun was recalled and Ibrahim took his place. He showed remarkable skill as a warrior, administered a crushing defeat on the Wahhabys by capturing their capital Deraya, massacred the inhabitants, razed the houses, sent Abdullah to Stamboul to be decapitated and returned to Cairo flushed with the glory of a marvellous triumph.

The Wahhaby war was a very costly one and Mehemet's finances needed replenishing. With this in view he undertook his next campaign, - to conquer and annex the Soudan. The Soudan had a lucrative caravan trade, which especially appealed to Mehemet Ali's commercial instincts. He wished to secure a monopoly of this trade and incidentally to obtain negro recruits for an army to overawe his turbulent Albanians.¹ The expedition began in 1820 when Ismael the youngest son of Mehemet Ali succeeded in taking and annexing Siwa. A short time later the main expedition started on its march up the Nile under the command of Ibrahim and Ismael. The native rulers were subdued one after another until Sennaar was reached. Then the army divided into two

1) Camérón, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 113.

parts one under Ismael to ascend the Blue Nile, and the other under Ibrahim to make its way up the White Nile. Everything turned out well for the brothers, until the conspiracy of a native chief caused the death of Ismael.¹ The act was avenged however by Ismael's brother-in-law Mohammed Bey Defterdar, who arriving with a large force from the conquest of Khordofan (1822), subjugated the rebellious community by terrible massacres. He entirely destroyed the old capital and built in its stead the modern Khartoum.² The next decade or two saw these regions become the hunting grounds for slaves, eunuchs and army recruits. Terrible cruelties were practiced by the local officials on their unfortunate captives. This, on the recommendation of various powers finally led in 1838 to an investigation of the Soudanese affairs. Mehemet Ali found that the evidence discovered substantiated the charges³ and he ordered the abolition of the slave trade. It however continued in a somewhat milder form for many years after.

1) Brehier, " L'Égypte de 1798 à 1900 " p. 131.

2) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 116.

3) English " Report on the Expedition to Sennaar " *passim* ..

Chapter II.

THE GREEK REVOLUTION.

In the preceding chapter we have seen how Mehemet Ali rose from a captain of a troop of Bashi-Bazuks to Pasha of Egypt. In this one, we shall see how the Sultan, driven into a most desperate position by the Greeks, was forced to appeal to his powerful vassal; and ^{how} Mehemet Ali, by the successes of his troops in the Morea showed his military strength and founded the claims against the Turkish government which were later to be pressed with such vigor.

In 1821 the Greek people with a strong feeling of patriotism aroused by the endeavors of the local hetaerias, inspired by the classic revival to emulate the deeds of their ancient ancestors, influenced by the ideas and ideals of the French revolutionary propaganda, saturated with an implacable hatred for the ruling Turk and confident of European sympathy and aid, took advantage of the internal disorders of the Ottoman empire and rose "en masse" in revolt. Hostilities were commenced in Moldavia. A Russian officier of Greek descent, Ypsilanti by name, accompanied by 200 men entered this province in the spring of 1821 and proclaimed himself the liberator of the Greeks. He posed as a representative of Russia. As such he was soon joined by considerable numbers and received the sub-

mission of the natives.¹

Russia, however, immediately disavowed his actions. On the ninth of April the Czar issued two proclamations, one of which "solemnly enjoined Ypsilanti and all the individuals under Russian protection who had taken any part in his enterprise, instantly to proceed to Russia and there await his imperial majesty's decision respecting their conduct." The second called upon the Moldavians to return to the allegiance of their legitimate ruler without delay. Deprived of the hope of Russian aid, the insurrection which had never strongly appealed to the native population² who in fact had nothing in common with the Greeks except religion,³ resulted in absolute failure. Meanwhile, however, a revolt of a thoroughly national character, one which was

*) Gordon prints the following letter which shows the Czar's attitude in regard to Ypsilanti

Prince:

My august sovereign has commanded me to intimate to you, that he could never have believed you would have been guilty of so foolish an enterprise - above all, at the very time when his Majesty's ambassador to the Ottoman Porte was protecting the interests of your family, and hoped some day to bring the matter to a favorable conclusion, according to the Emperor's wishes - at a moment too, when the Greek nation was making rapid progress in civilization. This imprudence of yours will bring on the Greeks great misfortunes. I therefore command you, in the name of the Emperor, my august master, to proceed no further, but on the contrary to disband, if possible the unhappy men whom you have misled.

Count Nesselrode.

Gordon - "History of Greece" Ch. I, p. 140.

1) Annual Register 1821, p. 247.

2) Fyffe, "Modern Europe" Ch. II, p. 273.

3) Annual Register 1821, p. 248.

ultimately to be successful, broke out simultaneously in the Morea and in the Aegean Islands. Because of its peculiarly national character, it at once attracted the attention of Europe and the Eastern Question again occupied a conspicuous place in European politics. The success or failure of the rebellion depended on what attitude Europe would take concerning it. The question was would Europe continue in its rigid adherence to Metternich's "European system" or would she cast it off and boldly set out on a new course. The past history of Europe undoubtedly favored the former assumption; while the complexity of the Eastern problem, the numerous and conflicting interests of the nations in the Ottoman Empire offered a good prospect for a change of policy.

Austria probably was most deeply interested in the welfare of the Ottoman Empire.* In the period directly before the Napoleonic wars, Austria had taken an aggressive attitude towards Turkey. In 1780 Joseph II and Catherine the Great of Russia in an interview at Kherson decided to expel the Ottoman Turk from Europe¹ and divide the territories

*) Metternich wrote, "The numerous points of contact which we have with both Turks and Greeks, the geographical situation of our states of Hungary, Italy, Dalmatia, etc., the prosperity of our commerce and navigation necessarily make us regard the pacification of the Ottoman provinces, as well as the future fate of Greece, as subjects of the highest importance." - Metternich's "Memoirs" No. 686.

1) Martens, "Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie." Vol. II, No. 36.

among themselves giving Egypt to France and other bribes to England and Spain for non-interference.¹ A few years later they went to war with Turkey for this object. It was only by the unexpected strength of Turkey and the opposition of England and Prussia that their schemes were defeated. In 1795 the government had actually proposed the renewal of this alliance between Austria and Russia for the same purpose.² "A few years later when dismemberment was threatened by Alexander and Napoleon, Metternich himself decided to join with them, if all diplomatic means to prevent it should fail."³ But this action was only to be taken as a last resort. Under normal conditions, he was a strong advocate of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a buffer state between Russia and Austria. Add to this his abhorrence of revolution and his hatred of nationalism, and we can easily conceive what his attitude would be in the existing Eastern disorders. There could be little doubt that he would pursue a strong anti-Greek policy.

Russia, on the other hand was expected to follow an opposite course. For many years she had been considered the chief source of danger to the Ottoman Empire. Russian agents had been busy almost everywhere causing local disturbances and unrest in the Sultan's possessions.⁴ Every

1) Leger, "A History of Austro-Hungary" p. 392.

2) Eyffe, "Modern Europe" Ch. II, p. 278.

3) Ibid p. 279.

4) Dennis, "Lectures on Relation of Europe to Asia."

opportunity that presented itself was made use of by the Czar to further the traditional policy of aggrandizement. All Europe knew that Russia's interests were best served in maintaining anarchy¹ in Turkey as she had done in Poland. The present Czar, however, was a conservative; he had identified himself with Metternich's system and even assented at Verona to the declaration which put the Greek revolt in the same category with the Spanish and Italian insurrections.² The question now was, would he continue to observe the principles enumerated at the last council or would he fall back on the aggressive system of Peter the Great and Catherine II.* It appeared at first that the former would prevail. Metternich on March 26, 1821 in a letter to Stadion, wrote "As for the Greek revolution - let it alone. I answer for it that Emperor Alexander has as little to do with that now as with the revolution in Piedmont."³ A few days later he said, writing of the policy that Austria and Russia would follow in the existing emergency, "the two monarchs have declared, that faithful to the principles which they have publicly announced, they will never support the enemies of

* S'il s'était arrêté en 1812 dans ses succès contre

le sultan Mahmoud, c'était uniquement pour pouvoir faire face à Napoleon. L'Empire français une fois renversé, la paix rétablit en Occident, il revenait et s'attachait, avec sa mystique tenacité de Slave, au vieux projet "ture" de Catherine II. - Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe." Ch.II, p. 101.

- 1) Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe" I, Ch.II, Sec.II.
- 2) Ibid I, p. 187.
- 3) Metternich, "Memoirs" No. 549.

public order, that they will never lend any help to the Greek insurgents".¹ But Metternich was not able to foresee the Turkish activities committed against a religion common to both Greeks and Russians and of which the Czar was the recognized protector;² he could not foretell the clamour of the Russian public for interference. Would the Czar submit to the public opinion or would he consider himself bound by the declaration of Laybach?

Let us take up England. England had shown herself strongly in favor of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In 1788 she entered in an alliance³ with Prussia and Holland and thereby assisted in the frustration of the ambitious plans of Austria and Russia. She was especially apprehensive of the growing power of Russia. The Czar was becoming too much of a factor in European politics and a danger to the maintenance of the "balance of power."⁴ Then too England was just beginning to look on the Eastern question from a different view point. Her policy was now to be characterized by a determination to keep the approaches to India from falling into the hands of a rival. Her determined effort to prevent the success of Napoleon's Egyptian campaign; her opposition to Mehemet Ali as an ally of France resulting in the expedition of 1807; her refusal to surrender

1) Metternich, "Memoirs" No. 548.

2) Treaties of Jassy, Kainardji and Bucharest.

3) De Gardien, "Histoire des Traites de Paix" IV - Ch. 25.

4) Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe" I, Ch. II, III.

Malta; and finally her establishment of a protectorate over the Ionian Islands, all tend to show that England was launching herself on a more defined course regarding the East and that that problem could never be settled without her consent. With France out of the way, Russia alone remained to threaten England's supremacy in the East, and every step that Russia took was watched with suspicion. For these reasons, fearing Russia as a danger both to the "balance of power" and to her Asiatic possessions England was continually putting the most unfavorable interpretation on the Czar's action and blamed him for almost every disorder in the East. Thus when the Greek revolution broke out, Great Britain did not hesitate in branding it as the work of the Czar. Castlereagh immediately decided that the interest of England required that she take an active part in aiding the Sultan to preserve his empire intact.¹

Prussia not having any possessions contiguous to Turkey could not hope to benefit directly from any dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. She therefore opposed it most vehemently. As has already been seen, in 1788 she united with England and Holland and succeeded in defeating the schemes of partition. A few years later when the dissolution of the Turkish empire again seemed imminent she did all in her power to prevent it. Prussia furthermore was one of

1) Sergeant, "History of Greece in 19th Century" p. 148.

the most sincere adherents of conservatism. Her natural policy in the Eastern troubles of this time, then of course would be to join England and Austria in discountenancing the Greek revolution.

France of all the powers, in spite of her attitude towards Egypt, had been Turkey's most ardent champion in the past. She had always found in Turkey a natural ally against the Hapsburg rule from the time of Francis I to that of Napoleon Bonaparte. It therefore had been France's policy in the past to keep Turkey as strong as possible and to disapprove any encroachments upon her territory. It is true that France herself looked upon Egypt with longing eyes;¹ it is true that Egypt usually was assigned to her in all the schemes of partition; yet she did not want Egypt at the expense of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Egypt in the event of a partition was certain to go to her anyway - then why hasten a dismemberment which meant the loss of a friend and ally?

Greece consequently, especially after the Czar's proclamation discouraging the insurrection, apparently could not expect much aid from Europe. The next question was, could she expect to be assisted by a simultaneous revolt of Mehemet Ali in Egypt. It was well known that Mehemet Ali entertained hopes of independence;² it was well known

1) Fournier, " Napoleon I, " p. 113.

2) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 121.

that he was strong enough to contend against the Sultan with a fair chance of success. Up to this time however Mehemet Ali had always remained loyal to the Porte. He had paid his tribute; he had always recognized the Porte's authority over Egypt; he had assisted the Porte against the Mamelukes and had reconquered Arabia. Would he now strike for freedom while the Porte was in a most critical condition; or would he come to her aid as he had done in the past?

With the hopes of foreign assistance crushed by the declaration of the powers at Laybach¹ and with Mehemet Ali's attitude regarding a simultaneous revolt in Egypt discouraging, the odds against Greece were apparently overwhelming. Furthermore her methods of warfare in the first campaign were not of a kind to allay the apparently hostile feeling of the powers. She initiated her revolt in the Morea by a series of massacres* that shocked the European world, which

 *) Finlay says - " In the month of April 1821, a Mussulman population generally of the Greek race, amounting to upwards of 20,000 souls was living, dispersed in Greece, employed in agriculture. Before two months had elapsed the greater part was slain - men, women and children were murdered on their own hearths without mercy or remorse." " History of Greece," Vol. VI, p. 139.

Karl Mendelssohn Bartholdy describing the same occurrence says - " Man berechnet; dass von ende März bis zum Ostersonntag 1821 (den 22 April) 15,000 Türken erschlagen wurden. Der Türke soll nicht mehr in Morea, bleiben, und überhaupt nicht mehr in der ganzen Welt, dies Lied damals in Jedermannes Munde, ward die Lösung der griechischen Bevölkerung." - " Geschichte Griechenlands " I, p. 191.
 2) Hertslet, " Map of Europe by Treaty." Vol. II, No. 108.

had they not been followed by reprisals on the part of the Turks, probably would have been fatal to her success. The Turks however, on learning the horrible fate of their fellow religionists immediately retaliated. The Greek churches were pillaged and destroyed; thousands of Greeks were slain in cold blood throughout Macedonia and Asia; and finally as a climax, for their crimes the Patriarch of the Greek church at Constantinople was hung on Easter Sunday in front of his own church.¹ Russia as the traditional protector of the Greek Christianity of the Ottoman Empire, recognized as such by virtue of several treaties with Turkey, immediately protested against these acts of cruelty. Turkey responded that Russia had no cause for complaint, in that no discrimination had been shown either as to religion or to nationality; Greek Patriarch had been executed for the crime of treason* and Turkey as a sovereign state possessed the sovereign right of stamping out rebellion by whatever means she found fit.² There the matter rested for a time. A more serious question, however, soon arose. Constantinople depended for her breadstuffs on her provinces. The maintenance of communication with these provinces was therefore absolutely necessary to the welfare of the capital. The Greek naval

*) This is also the argument made in the response to Russia's ultimatum. "Annuaire Historique Universel 1821." p. 656.

"Que tous les individus punis à la suite de cette insurrection et parmi eux le patriarche grec et autres prélats n'avaient subi que la peine qu'ils avaient mérités."

1) Gordon, "History of Greece" Vol. I, Ch. 3.

2) "Annuaire Historique Universel 1821," pp. 652-656.

(Reprints the last notes exchanged between Russia and Turkey)

power now threatened to interrupt these communications and Turkey in dread of a famine, issued orders for the closing of the Dardanelles to prevent the exportation¹ of grain from the Black Sea ports. The merchants of Odessa, whose principle² commerce was thus cut off, appealed to the Russian government for aid. Russia responded through her ambassador Baron Strognoff with a bitter remonstrance. Turkey defended her action as being necessary to the preservation of life and refused to withdraw the orders. Meanwhile, the Turks believing that Russia had instigated the Greeks to revolt, mobbed several Russian merchants in Constantinople and held in bondage a Russian ship loaded with arms and ammunition.² Strognoff again remonstrated and again received little satisfaction. He, therefore, on July 18, 1821, in compliance with his instruction from St. Petersburg presented the Porte with a note³ containing the conditions upon the acceptance of which would depend the continuation of amicable relations between the two governments. These conditions were:

1. The rebuilding and refurnishing of destroyed or pillaged Greek churches.
2. Distinction in punishment between the authors of the Greek troubles and those who had been led to take part.
3. The granting of pardon to the innocent and to those

1) Gordon "History of Greece" Vol. I, p. 197.

2) Annual Register 1821, p. 249. 1821

3) Annuaire Historique Universel, reprints this note, p. 652

who would submit within a definite period.

4. The coöperation of Russia and Turkey in the pacification of Greece.

5. The acceptance of these conditions within eight days.¹

Russia legally had no right to interfere. There was no principle of international law which recognized the interference of one government in the affairs of another with its subjects. She however, based her claim of interference on treaty rights. She invoked the treaties of Kainardji;² Jassy³ and Bucharest,⁴ which guaranteed the protection of the Christians, promised humane treatment and gave Russia the right to speak for the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and for the Isles of the Archipelago.

On July 26th the last day of the time allotted for the acceptance of the note, the Porte informed Strogonoff that its answer was ready but not in official form and therefore asked for an extension of two days. The arrogant⁵ Russian ambassador imprudently refused and Turkey not desirous of breaking with Russia just yet sent its final answer.⁶ The very same evening Str^ogonoff declared that the Turks had delayed too long, would not accept the note and asked for his passports. After some delay these were granted and on

August ninth he departed from Constantinople. Turkey a-

1) Gordon - "History of Greece" Vol. I. p. 199.

2) Noradounghian, "Actes Internationaux de L' Empire Ottoman" Vol. I, No. 36.

3) Ibid

Vol. II, No. 5.

4) Ibid

Vol. II, No. 30.

5) Annual Register 1821, p. 243.

6) Annuaire Historique Universel, reprints this answer. p. 652

larmed at the turn the affair had taken, immediately dispatched a note to Count Nesselrode who was controlling the Russian foreign policy. In this note Turkey complained of Baron Strogonoff's behavior and made an able defense of their own conduct in the Greek troubles. The Turks however, had little hope of a reconciliation and sent the note merely for the purpose of gaining time to complete their war preparations.¹ Meanwhile a proclamation was disseminated throughout the empire calling upon all true Mussulmen to come to the protection of their faith which Russia was threatening to exterminate. This appeal to religion all the more aroused the animosity of Russia.

She too was preparing for war. In June 1821, she sent a note² to the various powers asking: (1) what attitude would they take in case of a war between Russia and Turkey? (2) What system would they suggest as a substitute for Turkish rule providing that rule were to be terminated by such a war? This note was accompanied by documents describing the complications between Russia and Turkey; the commitment of the powers to a policy of protecting the Christians of the Ottoman Empire and finally the preeminent right of Russia to interest herself in the Greek revolt. The Czar then addressed a note³ to Count Alopus at Berlin in which

1) Annual Register 1821, p. 253.

2) Sergeant, "History of Greece in the 19th Century" p. 146.

3) Ibid

he offered the Russian army to the powers in case they decided to interfere. Prussia on receiving the communication, immediately proposed a European conference to treat of Eastern affairs.

The proposal unfortunately, met with little favor among the other powers.¹ Austria, still under the absolute control of Metternich, looked with alarm at a proposition of European interference on behalf of nationalism and revolution. In England, both Castlereagh and Wellington saw in Russia's apparently friendly proposition only a cloak under which were concealed ulterior designs against the Ottoman territory, inimical to the interests of Great Britain. Austria and England consequently drew together and Metternich² instructed Count Lutzow to unite with Lord Strangford at Constantinople in pressing the Porte to accept the demands of Russia and thereby prevent war. Austria even went so far as to propose³ for this very purpose a conference of all the powers at Vienna. England naturally accepted but Russia snubbed by Austria in rejecting her earlier proposition, avenged herself by now rejecting Austria's.

Castlereagh decided that something must be done in case the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was to be preserved. He therefore planned an alliance of Austria, Great Britain and France. For this purpose Metternich was invited to

1) Gardon, "History of Greece" Vol. I, p. 202.

2) Metternich's "Memoirs" No. 624.

3) Sergeant, "History of Greece" p. 149.

meet the British sovereign at Hanover. The Eastern question had by this time resolved itself into two parts:

(1) the Russo-Turkish misunderstanding (2) the pacification of Greece.¹ The powers first devoted their efforts to settle the first question. Metternich accordingly met the King of Great Britain at Hanover on the twentieth of October 1821 and came to a good understanding with that sovereign.* He wrote in a letter to Emperor Francis describing the result of the meeting, " I think I have thoroughly attained the object of my journey. England takes the same ground as we do. (1) The two cabinets consider the maintenance of peace between Russia and Turkey as the most important object of their common efforts. To facilitate these they will leave nothing undone to enlighten Russia as to the danger of a breach, at the same time calling upon the Porte for an exact fulfilment of the treaty and moderation in its demands. (2) * * * the two cabinets have drawn up one dispatch to St. Petersburg and another to Constantinople, in which the above views are strongly developed. * * * * * On both sides the conclusion arrived at is, the necessity that Russia should maintain peace; for under present circumstances, the evil consequents of any political war would be incalculable."² That the two Powers will exert

*) The agreement was really made with Lord Londonderry

1) Metternich's " Memoirs " No. 615.

2) This characterizes Austria's attitude throughout this whole period.

their whole influence on the Porte to attain this all important object; but that it does not come within the province of the Powers to interfere with actual force in case opposition is made; that lastly, the views which may be entertained by Russia of the greatest possible strengthening of the friendly relations between that power and the Porte must be put forth by Russia herself, and can in no way proceed from the allies."¹

Russia replied to the dispatch of England and Austria, that she had not intended to act without the sanction of Europe.* The Czar himself, in spite of a strong war party in the cabinet, was opposed to the war.² "In conformity with his determination to uphold the authority of sovereigns, he abstained from war with the Sultan, and in order to uphold his claim to protect the orthodox in Turkey and keep open a pretext for war, he vexed the Ottoman government with unceasing demands."³

Meanwhile all the attempts by the ambassadors at Constantinople, to settle the question of the pacification

*) "At this time there were two parties in the Russian cabinet - one was strenuously engaged in endeavoring to bring about a war with Turkey, the other was desirous of preserving peace. It was the war party, which without the knowledge of the Emperor, who was a peace man, fomented the Greek insurrection, in order to render the opportunity more favorable for an attack on Turkey."

Stapleton, "Canning" p. 455.

1) Metternich "Memoirs" p. 556.

2) Stapleton, "Canning" p. 455.

3) Finlay, "History of Greece" Vol. VI, p. 195.

of Greece, failed,* They could not advise the Greeks to fight more humanly for fear that such advice would be taken in the light of giving sanction to their revolution; neither could they agree to a proposition of amnesty since Russia, in case the Greeks refused, would be deprived of her right to further uphold their cause at Constantinople.¹

War between Russia and Turkey every day became more probable. On January 8th 1822 Metternich made another appeal to Russia for the preservation of the principles of the Holy Alliance. "The first and most certain effects of the war," he said, "would be a general attack on the Alliance, the existence of which would become doubtful if one of the allied Courts should take upon itself the burden of the war, and which would cease to be formidable in the eyes of revolutionists when the forces of several of the Powers were employed in the East."² Then he continued with a brief sketch of Austria's attitude regarding the Eastern Question, stating that her policy had been and would continue to be one of trying "to save the cause of peace by all the means in her power." He finally concluded with the assertion that it was the duty of Russia to separate^{the} question of the Greek revolt as such, from the question of the persecution of the Greeks as Christians.

* The chief notes presented to the Porte and the references to them are found in the appendix of the *Annuaire Historique Universel*. 1822.

1) Sergeant, "History of Greece in the 19th Century," p. 150.
2) Metternich, "Memoirs" No. 615.

The Czar adopted this report in full and instructed Nesselrode to open the Eastern Question at the Congress of Verona.* On the 9th of November 1822, Nesselrode began the discussion and declared that Russia was willing to resume diplomatic relations with Turkey, providing the latter would prove by her action, her willingness to respect the rights of the Christians and to reestablish peace in Greece. Wellington responded for England, that in his opinion Turkey had already displayed such a series of facts and that in view of this, it was Russian's duty to restore her embassy at Constantinople. On the 27th November, Tatistcheff notified the Congress that the Czar entirely confided to the "wisdom of his allies the direction of all future negotiations."¹ The powers accepted the invitation and immediately put themselves to their task. The differences between Russia and Turkey were gradually cut down to three: (1) a compensation to Russia in proportion to the injury caused her by Turkey's attitude on the navigation of the Black Sea; (2) the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia by the Turkish troops and (3) the appointment of Greek Hospodars as in former times.² The Porte's consent was easily obtained in regard to the first point. But not so as regards the others. She objected vehemently to withdrawing her soldiers from the two Danubian principalities at a time of such unrest; and

1) Sergeant, "History of Greece in the 19th Century" p 154.

2) Tatistcheff dispatch to Metternich March 8, 1822. Metternich's "Memoirs" No. 616.

*) Metternich. "Memoirs" No. 622.

was still more averse to place in the hands of the Greeks two such important commands as those of the Hospodars. Finally however, by the combined pressure of England* and Austria, she submitted and the critical moment which threatened to involve all Europe in another great war had passed by. A treaty was signed at Ackermann¹ (1826) in which the differences between Russia and Turkey were settled and the diplomatic relations renewed.

While the European statesmen and diplomats were settling this Russo-Turkish affair, Greece kept up her heroic struggle for independence. During the very first year of the war the rebels conquered the greater part of the Peloponnessus, formally declared their independence at Epidaurus² on the 27th of January, 1822, and adopted a constitution. The next year was no less fortunate for them. At the end of 1822 Patras, Napoli, Koron, and Modoni were the only ports that remained to the Sultan.³ One event alone prevented their complete triumph; that was the attitude of Europe

*) Metternich says the following of England's influence in bringing about the reconciliation - "The wise determination which the Porte has at length taken, after Lords Strangford's urgent appeal in the name of the loyal friendship and earnest desire for the preservation of peace of all the allied courts, has met from the Emperor of Russia, that reception which we expected from the high sentiments of that monarch." Metternich's "Memoirs" No. 685.

1) Noradounghian, "Actes Internation. de L'Empire Ottoman." Nos. 38, 39, and 40.

2) The Constitution can be found in the *Annuaire Historique Universel* among the documents 1822, p. 674.

3) Annual Register 1822, p. 274.

in refusing recognition to the Greek representatives at Verona and in violently denouncing their insurrection.

Their appeal although it failed to move the men that controlled the governments, touched the hearts of the people at large. Sympathy from all parts of the world was extended to them. In England, Sir John Mackintosh on July 15th presented a petition¹ to Parliament from the inhabitants of Lees which "referred to the sufferings of the Christian Greeks and the oppressions of the Turkish government," and begged the English government to interfere. Mr. Hume complained that England was favoring the Turks in the struggle.² Mr. Hutchinson commended England's policy in the Russo-Turkish dispute but censured her for her attitude in the Greek affairs. He said, "If the exertions of England have been put forth only for the purpose of allowing the Turks to commit whatever havoc their barbarous ferocity might prompt them to - if this has been the object of his majesty's ministers in England and in Constantinople, then their object is the most abject and degraded." Mr. Wilberforce even went so far as to express his regret that the powers had not combined and driven the Turk from Europe.³ In London a Greek committee was organized "for the purpose of advancing by all means in their power⁴ the cause of the Greeks

1) Hansard, "Parliamentary Debates" Vol. VII, p. 1648.

2) Ibid p. 1650.

3) Ibid p. 1651.

4) Circular of the London Greek Committee printed in Gordon's "History of Greece" Vol. II, p. 84.

Through their aid the Greeks were able to contract in the spring of 1824, a loan of 800,000 l. Various people sent direct subscriptions^{to} the cause and some like Byron even enlisted in the Greek army. In Germany committees were organized which worked in harmony with the British Philhellenes. In France, Chateaubriand¹ championed the Greek cause and through his influence the Greeks received several cargos of arms, ammunition and money. In the United States, President Monroe in his annual message to Congress expressed the sympathy of his countrymen for the Greeks² in the following terms: "Greece fills the mind with the most exalted sentiments and arouses in our bosoms the best feeling of which our nature is susceptible. Superior skill and refinement in the arts, heroic gallantry in action, disinterested patriotism, enthusiastic zeal and devotion in favor of public and personal liberty are associated with our recollections of ancient Greece. That such a country should have been overwhelmed and so long hidden, as it were, from the world under a gloomy despotism has been a cause of unceasing and deep regret to generous minds for ages past. It was natural therefore, that the reappearance of those people in their original character, contending in favor of their liberties, should produce that great excitement and sympathy in their favor which have been so signally

1) Sergeant, "History of Greece in the 19th Century" p. 162.

2) Richardson, "Messages and Papers of Presidents" Vol. II, p. 193.

displayed throughout the United States. A strong hope is entertained that these people will recover their independence." In fact there was hardly a country in the Christian world which did not in some way or other send encouragement to the struggling nation.

The war during 1823 raged with unabated fury, but without any decisive results.¹ Metterich summarizes the situation at the end of 1823 as follows: "The astuteness of the Greeks and the stupidity of the Turks have caused the failure of two maritime expeditions; and the want of provisions, the result of total absence and foresight, has twice shut out the Ottoman armies from completing the conquests which they accomplished by ^{the} simple movement which carried them forward."² By the summer of 1824 the Sultan was so near the end of his resources that he called upon Mehemet Ali, who had at last decided to remain loyal to the Porte, to aid him in suppressing the insurrection.³ Mehemet Ali responded immediately and embarked 8000 men and 1000 horses at Alexandria under the command of Ibrahim. When these Egyptian troops disciplined according to European methods, after having reduced Crete⁴ to submission, arrived in Greece, they found it in a state of civil war. The Greeks had no single great leader like Washington or Gar-

1) Annual Register 1823, p. 233.

2) Metternich, "Memoirs" No. 682.

3) Gordon, "History of Greece" Vol. II, p. 91.

4) Ibid

baldi, but rather a large number of local chiefs each bitterly jealous of the other. As soon as they had freed themselves of the common enemy they divided into factions and fought among themselves for the control of the government. Ibrahim immediately began his task. In coöperation with Rashid Pasha, he mapped out a campaign in which it was Ibrahim's duty to subdue the southern provinces while Rashid was to march against Missolonghi and suppress the rebellion in the north.¹ The campaign resulted in complete success for the Turks.

Divided among themselves by petty jealousies; threatened with extermination at the hands of the Egyptain chief, without funds or war materials due to the corruption of their civil officers, the Greek Senate and Executive were induced towards the end of July to place their country under the protection of Great Britain; a formal manifesto * to

*) The Manifesto was as follows:

" The clergy, the representatives and the great naval and military chiefs of the Greek nation, considering that the Greeks have taken up arms in defence of mankind's natural and imprescriptible right to freedom of property, religion, and liberty and have for four year resisted the colossal forces of Egypt, Asia, and Africa thereby acquiring a title to political existence: * * * * * That the free government of Great Britain is the only one that has observed a strict neutrality: That the forces of his Britanic majesty are close at hand, and that in this desperate struggle we ought to have recourse to the philanthropy of his government. We therefore prescribe, enact and determine the following laws (See foot-note on next page).

1) Annual Register 1825, p. 185.

this effect was issued and signed by more than 2000¹ of the prominent inhabitants.

England of course could not accept the offer without going to war. Canning therefore declined it; but his language to the Greeks made it plain to all Europe that England was pledged to Greek interests and in that capacity would favor any scheme of intervention favorable to her protegee.

Russia as early as 1824 had proposed to the Great Powers that they discuss the pacification of Greece in conferences to be held at St. Petersburg and according to a plan drawn up by her ministry.

The plan was drawn up by Count Nesselrode and clearly showed the Russian aims in the Balkan question. The territory of Greece was to be split up into four districts governed by hospodars appointed by the Sultan. These divisions were to be semi-independent paying a tribute to Turkey. Russia would be the only one that would gain anything in case this plan was accepted. She could not lose no matter what would happen. Gordon sums up the situation

as follows:² " If the Turks resisted such an arrangement,

Art. I. " In virtue of the present act, the Greek nation plans the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political existence under the absolute protection of Great Britain?

Art. II. * * * * *

Art. III. " The President of the council shall immediately execute the present laws."

Napoli, July 20, 1825. Gordon, "Greek Revolution" II, 83

1) Sergeant, " History of Greece " p. 178.

2) Gordon, " History of Greece " Vol. I, p. 89.

as they certainly would have done, Russia found an unexceptional reason for going to war; and were it carried into effect the Hospodars were sure to become dependencies of Muscovy." The Powers consented to discuss Russia's proposition and the conferences were held; but before anything could be accomplished, England declared to the Allied Cabinets that " considerations founded partly on its own connection with the countries in the Levant, partly on the difficulty of affecting under the circumstances a reconciliation between the Porte and the insurgents,"¹ prevented her from any longer taking part in the Conferences. Without England the Conference of course could achieve little since " any attempt at intervention would lose a great part of its weight at Constantinople, by confirming the Porte in its long-cherished suspicion that the principle powers of Europe were no longer united in their views and system."² The four other powers in spite of Englands desertion continued the Conferences and finally agreed to send a remonstrance to the Sultan. The Porte justifying Canning's expectations replied in a contemptuous tone.³

Canning's attitude towards the St. Petersburg Conferences and his practical recognition of Greece as an independent state by his dealings with the Greek patriots were a

1) This was Canning's explanation to Austria. Metternich, " Memoirs " No. 828.

2) Metternich, " Memoirs " No. 828.

3) Sergeant, " History of Greece " p. 118. Digitized by Google

sure index of his opposition to the system of the Holy Alliance and brought down upon him the wrath of Metternich.*

"In England," the Austrian statesman wrote to Esterhazy, "a man has sprung to the head of affairs. He has aimed at founding his power on an appeal to the prejudices of his country. Up to this time he has succeeded in his enterprise; but has he served his country and the general cause, which is undoubtedly also that of England? * * * * * Canning is deceiving himself. Europe at present has but one real need which is political repose. She should therefore not favour that which tends to disturb it." ¹

It is true England wanted repose but she wanted to bring it about in a different way from Austria. In this contest between Metternich and Canning, the latter won out. Russia preferred the alliance of Great Britain to that of Austria; France too in spite of her reactionary king, favored Canning's policy. Austria consequently was isolated and London replaced Vienna as the center of the negotiations regarding the Eastern Problem. Canning still retained his

*) Metternich was justified in his belief that Canning was planning the dissolution of the Holy Alliance. Canning practically admitted this when he offered England's aid to Greece. He said "There ought to be a point in the contest in which Great Britain might exert her influence to promote a compromise between the Greeks and the Porte; not for the entire independence of Greece, for that would be asking everything and could not be the subject of a compromise, but for anything short of independence, which might form the basis of an arrangement with the Porte." Sergeant, "History of Greece in the 19th Century" p. 179.

1) Metternich, "Memoirs" No. 778. .

old dread of Russia. He hoped that by a combination of Britain, France and Austria, Russia's scheme of acting independently against the Porte¹ could be frustrated. His plans received a temporary set-back by the death of Alexander and the accession of Nicholas who determined to settle the Eastern question on his own account and without delay.²

If the Powers were sincere in their desires to save Greece from falling back into the hands of Turkey or else from becoming a part of the Russian Empire, they had to act soon. The forces of Ibrahim Pasha were successful everywhere and by 1826 little of the Morea remained that was not in the hands of the Turks. The Egyptain chieftain was fighting a war of extermination. Before his forces had been put in motion Mahmoud II and Mehemet Ali had come to an understanding by which Mehemet was to be given "the disposal of any part of the Morea that he might conquer; and that his plan for disposing of his conquest was to remove the whole Greek population, carrying them off into slavery in Egypt or elsewhere and to repeople the country with Mohammadans."³ Although the Sultan later denied that such a contract had ever been made, all of Ibrahim's actions in the war seemed to prove the authenticity of the agreement.

He massacred the inhabitants in horrible manner and actually

1) Sergeant, "History of Greece" p. 181.

2) Gordon, "History of Greece" Vol. II, p. 305.

3) Memoir given by Prince Lieven to Canning Oct. 1825, Stapleton, "Canning" p. 474.

prepared to ship the survivors to Egypt.¹

Either because of the actions of the Egyptian Pasha or of the attitude of the Russian Czar or more probable because of both of these, Canning proposed another Conference for the discussion of the pacification of Greece. In the autumn of 1825 Stratford Canning had been sent to Constantinople. On his way there he had stopped at the Morea and in an interview with two of the local chiefs received from them an authorization * to suggest to Turkey " a basis for the inglorious pacification and future government of Greece." ² Canning's objection^s to the past propositions of mediation, as he himself said, were thus obviated. In the

*) Peace was to be negotiated on the following terms:

- 1) That no Turk shall be permitted to inhabit or hold property in the territory of Greece, on account of its being impossible for the two nations to live together.
- 2) That all the fortresses which the Turks possess in Greece shall be evacuated, and restored to the Greeks.
- 3) That the Sultan shall have no authority over the internal administration, or the clergy.
- 4) That Greece shall be allowed to keep up a sufficient force for the domestic security, and a navy to protect her trade.
- 5) That the Greeks shall have a flag of their own.
- 6) That the same privileges and rights shall be extended to the Peloponnesus * * * * and all the provinces which have taken up arms and been incorporated with the Greek government.
- 7) That the amount of their tribute be fixed, and made payable either annually, or at one time.
- 8) That they be entitled to coin money.

Done at Epidamus, April 28, 1826.

Gordon, " History of Greece " Vol. II, p. 329.

- 1) Several thousands were shipped to Egypt. Annual Register 1824, p. 242.
- 2) Sergeant, History of Greece " p. 186.

first place, since one of the parties had asked for mediation there was a far greater chance of success than when neither party had asked for or wanted mediation. Secondly, the Powers now had a direct authority to act since the Greek government had made a formal application. Thirdly, the question of a "war for Greece" was disposed of.¹ Although some of these arguments were extremely weak, nevertheless they served Canning's purpose in giving him a pretext for reopening the Greek Question. On the strength of this "authorization," the Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg to get Russia to cooperate with England. On April 4th 1826 a protocol² was signed by Wellington for England and by Nesselrode and Lieven for Russia by which the two Powers agreed to propose to Turkey the pacification of Greece according to the following terms:

- 1) That Greece be a tribute state of Turkey.
- 2) That the tribute money be fixed.
- 3) That the Greeks be governed by self-chosen officials.
- 4) That the Porte be given some power in the nomination of these officials
- 5) That the inhabitants be permitted to enjoy liberty of conscience.
- 6) That the Greeks purchase the property of the Turks.*

England and Russia furthermore agreed " not to seek in this

1) Stapleton, " Canning " p. 483.

2) Annuaire Historique Universel 1827, App. 96.

*)(See foot-note on next page)

arrangement, any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage in commerce for their subjects, which shall not be equally attainable by all the other nations.¹

This protocol was to be communicated to Austria, France and Prussia and invitations to take part in a conference to discuss the question on the preceding basis were to be extended to them. Austria refused to join on the ground that a power could not mediate between another power and its revolted subjects. Prussia declared herself ready to subscribe to the terms of the protocol, provided the five courts were unanimous.² France immediately concurred and proposed the transformation of the protocol into a treaty. Russia and England showed their willingness to comply with the new

 *) " La Grèce serait une dépendance de l'empire Ottoman et les Grecs paieraient à la Porte un tribut annuel dont le montant serait fixé une fois pour toutes d'un commun accord. Les Grecs seraient exclusivement gouvernés par les autorités qu'ils nommeraient eux-mêmes, mais sur la nomination des quelles la Porte aurait une certaine influence."
 " Dans cet état de choses les Grecs, jouiraient d'une pleine liberté de commerce et auraient la direction exclusive de leurs affaires intérieures."
 " Afin d'effectuer une séparation complète entre les individus des deux nations, et de prévenir les querelles que seraient la conséquence nécessaire d'une lutte aussi prolongée, les Grecs seraient tenus d'acheter les biens appartenant aux Turcs, soit sur les continent de la Grèce, soit dans les îles." Protocol of April 4th, printed in the Annuaire Historique Universel 1827, App. 96.

1) Translation of Art. V. of the note. The original is as follows: "S. M. B. et S. M. I. ne chercheront dans cet arrangement aucun accroissement de territoire ni aucun influence exclusive, ni aucun avantage commercial pour leurs sujets, auquel les autres nations ne puissent également prétendre."

2) Metternich, "Memoirs" No. 856.

proposal, but the two German states maintained the position they had held in regard to the original protocol. England, France and Russia then decided to get along without both Austria and Prussia. On June 10th 1827 they offered their mediation to Turkey who summarily rejected it.¹ The two signatory ^{Powers} however, were not discouraged and on July 6th 1827 united with France in signing the treaty of London² by which they agreed to continue their efforts to terminate the anarchy in Turkey; to demand an amnesty; and to renew *"armistice"* their offers of mediation according to the terms of the protocol of 1826. The treaty also contained three secret articles: the first declared the necessity of taking immediate measures for forming a connection with the Greeks by an exchange of consuls; the second stated that in case either of the interested parties rejected the amnesty within ~~one~~ month the signatory powers would exert all means to obtain the immediate effects of amnesty by preventing as far as possible, all collision between the contending parties; thirdly they announced that in case mediation failed their attempts to bring about the pacification of Greece would not on that account cease.

It can be seen by the terms of this treaty that the three contracting Powers did not expect to grant complete independence to Greece but rather establish the state on the

1) Response is reprinted in *Annuaire Historique Universel* 1827, App. 99.

2) Noradounghian, "Actes Internation. de L'Empire Ottoman" Vol. II, No. 42.

model of Servia.¹ The Powers twice offered their mediation² to the Porte who rejected it both times. They, therefore according to the treaty notified the Porte that they would begin to enforce the amnesty clause. The admirals of the French and English fleets in the Greek waters were accordingly instructed to prevent any hostile movements from being undertaken by the Turco-Egyptain fleet which lay in the harbor of Navarino.³ Ibrahim also was notified of the decision of the Powers but paid little heed to it. On October 26, 1827 the allied fleets sought winter quarters in the harbor of Navarino. The Turks believing themselves attacked fired on the Allies and a general action followed, in which the Turco-Egyptain fleet was almost destroyed.⁴

The ambassadors of the Allied Powers again offered their mediation to the Porte. Austria to the surprise of the allies* displayed a hearty good-will to further their object.⁵ But the Porte claiming her right as a sovereign to put down a revolt without interference from outside rejected mediation

*) Austria denied that she had changed her policy. The Austrian Observation of 24th December says - "The instructions of the internuncios since the commencement of the insurrection, had been based upon the same principles, the same spirit, aiming at the same end, and have only undergone the alleged modification by a change in circumstances." "Annuaire Historique Universel 1827" App. 107.

- 1) Sergeant, "History of Greece" p. 193.
- 2) Noradounghian, "Actes Internationaux de L'Empire Ottoman" Vol. II, p. 43, 44.
- 3) Annual Register 1827, p. 318.
- 4) Out of 82 vessels 27 remained. Karl Mendelsohn Bartholdy, "Geschichte Griechenlands" Vol. I, p. 487.
- 5) Annual Register 1827, p. 314.

as she had done in July and February.¹ As early as October she had appealed to Austria "with the hope that Austria as the true friend of all the courts will employ her good offices to overcome the crisis that has arisen between the Porte and its friends."² But Austria by this time convinced that a return to the old regime in Greece was impossible and that even though Turkey suppressed the rebellion this time, it would soon break out again, did not accept the task of mediating between Turkey and the Allies.

The prospects of Greek independence were now very bright; but an event soon occurred which put a damper on the Greek's hopes. This was the death of Canning,* the best friend that Greece had had. He was succeeded by Lord Goderich who held his office until January 10th, 1828. The Duke of Wellington then became prime minister with Lord Aberdeen as his foreign secretary.

Although both Canning and Wellington feared Russia they differed radically in their views on the means to be

 *) "Metternich's hatred of Canning remained even after his death. On hearing of the sad event he wrote, " I do not think it necessary to repeat to you (Esterhazy) the opinion we have from the first entertained of the merits of the man whom Providence hurled upon England and Europe like a malevolent meteor." He has shaken everything and destroyed a great deal, but he has built up nothing - a sad but common thing with men of his stamp. England is delivered from a great scourge." Metternich, "Memoir" No. 864.

1) Noradounghian, " Actes Internation. de L'Empire Ottoman " Vol. II, No. 49.

2) Letter of Mehemet Selim Pasha to Metternich. Metternich, " Memoirs " No. 875.

adopted to prevent her from realizing her ambitions. Canning's means which had been successful up to his death consisted in remaining friendly with Russia even to the point of entering into alliance with her, but by all means preventing her from acting alone in Turkish affairs. Wellington also feared Russia's motives* but instead of joining her drew away from her. Russia left alone, immediately declared war¹ on her own account against Turkey. The long labors of Canning were lost; the object which he had been working for so diligently was not to be accomplished.

On August 30, 1828 a French army of 14,000 men under General Maison was landed in Greece. England had been asked to cooperate but unfortunately had refused.²

Ibrahim was permitted to take his troops back to Egypt.³ Those that remained in Greece were quickly expelled. The

*) Metternich also feared Russia's motives. He wrote to Esterhazy May 31, 1828 - "The Czar does not desire its (the Ottoman Empire's) death, but its ruin, he does not care to add small portions to his territory in Europe; - he would require the whole of the greater part of the whole to make the enterprise worth the trouble." Metternich, "Memoirs" No. 848.

1) Palmerston said regarding the war: "Europe has a clear right upon general principles and independently of any engagements by Russia, to see that the war between her and Turkey shall not derange the balance of power, and alter the state of possession as fixed by the last general peace." - Bulwer - Palmerston Vol. I, p. 224. This shows that the balance of power idea was still the prevalent one in regard to his attitude toward Russia.

2) (See foot-note on next page).

3) (See foot-note on next page).

success of Russia was no less rapid and completed the liberation of Greece. On Sept. 14th 1829 Turkey signed a treaty of peace¹ at Adrianople with Russia. One of the articles of this treaty provided for the acceptance of the protocol of London.² A short time later the Porte formed an agreement with England and France by which she pledged herself " to subscribe entirely to the clauses which the Conference of London shall adopt " ³ with respect to the execution of the terms of the Treaty of London.

All that now remained to be done was to call such a

2) Palmerston wrote to Temple on May 8, 1828. " The French government say they must send money and wish to send troops, and propose that 6000 English and an equal number of French should go; that was always my plan, and I proposed it to Goodrich in November; but nobody else approved of it and it is not more in favor now." Bulwer, Palmerston Vol. I, p. 227.

3) Admiral Codrington had made a treaty with the Pasha of Egypt for the evacuation of the Morea by the Egyptians under Ibrahim his son, with an article that the slaves who were still unsold, should be returned; and those who had been sold, the Pasha should in conjunction with the consuls of the Allies use his influence to restore.†
The treaty is reprinted in Annuaire Historique Universel 1828, - App. 137.

1) Noradounghian, " Actes Internation. de L' Empire Ottoman" Vol. II, No. 53.

2) Art. X of the Treaty of Adrianople provided- " La Sublime Porte, en déclarant son entière adhésion aux stipulations du traité conclu à Londres le 24 juin 1827 entre la Russie la Grande Bretagne et la France, accède également à l'acte arrêté le 10 mars 1829, d'un commun accord, entre ces mêmes puissances, sur la base dudit traité et contenant les arrangements de détail relatifs à son exécution définitif.

3) Sergeant, reprints this agreement, " History of Greece" p. 207.

Conference. On December 12, 1828, the representatives of Great Britain, France and Russia had met at Poros and discussed the independence of Greece. No definite arrangement had been made however. So another Conference was held March 22, 1829, this time at London. The three Powers determined upon an agreement ¹ by which Greece on the one hand was to be placed under the suzerainty of the Sultan, was to pay an annual tribute of 1,500,000 piasters and an indemnity for the destruction of Turkish property in Greece and the Porte on the other hand was to have a voice in the nomination and confirmation of an hereditary chief or Prince of Greece.* This arrangement was objected to by the Greeks ² and on February 3, 1830 a third Conference was called. After some difficulty the following scheme was endorsed by the Conference: (1) Greece was to form an independent state and was to enjoy all the rights political, administrative, and commercial, attached to complete independence; (2) its boundaries were described; (3) the Greek government was to be monarchical, and hereditary according to primogeniture. It was to be confided to a prince chosen from the families of the sovereigns who had not signed the treaty of July 6th. The selection of this prince was

- *) " Ce Chef ne pourra être choisi parmi les Princes familles qui règnent dans les trois Etats signataires du traité du 6 juillet 1827." Noradounghian, " Actes Internation. de L' Empire Ottoman." Vol. II, No. 50.
- 1) Noradounghian, " Actes Internation. de L' Empire Ottoman " Vol. II, No. 50.
- 2) Annuaire Historique Universel 1829, App. 110.

to form the subject of a later Conference.¹

It was this arrangement which gave the Greeks their independence. The boundaries were extended in 1832 and a prince chosen as hereditary monarch.² It is to be noticed however that neither Austria nor Prussia were represented in these Conferences. Both probably would have been willing to unite with the Allies had the latter not decided to get along without them. Austria was particularly eager at this time to further schemes of Greek independence. Palmerston accounts for Austria's change in the following manner: "The fact is, that Metternich is changing entirely his line; and having found that he could not prevent the Russian war and the liberation of Greece by virtue of the Treaty of London, he is now turning away, and endeavoring to outstrip the Allies in the career of liberality to appear in this way to lead Europe, which is his great ambition. Thus he now maintains that Greece ought to be made quite independent of Turkey."³

Thus without the aid of either Austria or Prussia the Eastern question was settled not "irrevocably" as the Allies asserted in 1832 but temporarily. Incidentally mehemet Ali

1) Noradounghian, "Actes Internation. de L'Empire Ottoman" Vol. II, No. 56.

2) Ibid

3) Bulwer, "Palmerston" Vol. I. p. 283.

the Pasha of Egypt had learned his great strength, seen the weakness of the Porte and had secured promises from the Sultan which were ultimately to lead to the Egyptian war of Independence in 1839.

Chapter III

MEHEMET ALI AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

Although the cause of the Sultan had been maintained in Greece with the treasure and blood of Egypt, although an opportunity of declaring his independence apparently with every chance of success,¹ had been rejected by Mehemet Ali, his ambitions of independence still remained. He declared that, "before any good could be effected in Egypt, a stable government must be established, free from the constant changes of pashas sent from Stamboul."² Before going to war for this contention he decided to prove its truth to the world by the establishment of a strong government in Egypt.

The first number of his program was the confiscation of all existing land titles and the concentration of all land ownership in himself. He accomplished this object by (1) the extermination of the Mamelukes who owned vast tracts of land; (2) by the transference to himself, of the administration of the revenues derived from the "wakf" or property in mortmain bequeathed to the Ulema a religious organization; and (3) by the abolition of all private tenure and a resumption of the principle of regal ownership³ which had been held by Selim I in the sixteenth

1) Malortie, "Egypt" p. 32.

2) Cameron, "Egypt in the 19th Century" p. 121.

3) Ibid

century. The next thing was to organize this land. It was divided into several great provinces ruled over by Mudirs whose duty it was to maintain the canals, apportion the cultivation of the land, and collect the harvest and revenue ¹ These large divisions were again divided in parts ruled by Mamours who were responsible to the Mudir for the taxes of their districts and for the welfare of their communities. This land was cultivated by the peasants or fellaheen who paid the Sultan a heavy rental. In 1821 out of a total revenue of 1,250,000 l. one half was derived from the land tax.² In the collection of this tax much cruelty was practiced, and Holroyd wrote to Palmerston that "his (Mehemet Ali's) selfish and oppressive* system of government has reduced his subjects to the most abject slavery."³

After having organized his land system Mehemet Ali undertook the reorganization of the finances. By making the officials of the provinces and of the districts directly responsible for a specified sum and by strictly enforcing all tariffs and imports, Mehemet Ali was always well supplied

*) Various views are taken as to whether the condition of the fellaheen was worse under the rule of Mehemet Ali than it had been before. Paton, Cameron, Yates and most of the English writers seem to think it was; while the French are inclined to deny it. Russell takes a neutral attitude: He says - "As to the agricultural laborers or Fellahs the innovations of the Pasha have probably left them in nearly the same state in which, as far as history goes, they appear always to have been, with the additional disadvantage, if such, it must be esteemed, of submitting to the military conscription." View of Ancient and Modern Egypt, p. 261.

1) Paton, "Egyptian Revolution" Vol. II, p. 78.

2) Yates, "Egypt" Vol. I, p. 120

3) English Political Pamphlets. Vol. 105. n. 8.

with money* There were taxes on trades and occupations, flax, linen, provisions and all other imports and exports; on baths, coffee-houses, trees, Jews and prostitutes; on oxen, water-wheels, agricultural instruments, warehouses; on granaries, d'germs for transporting produce; and on public dancing-girls, and slaves, besides a heavy tithe on the produce, the general poll-tax, and the tax on land which we have spoken of above.¹ Under this heavy burden of taxes, which by the way were not always collected in the most humane way, the peasant plodded along, many times having barely enough to eat.

But there was another source from which the Pasha derived his revenues - the monopolies. He had a monopoly of all the chief produce.** He bought the produce from the

 *) The revenue of 1839 was calculated to be 462,841 purses, 447 piasters - reckoning 25 talaris to the purse. The chief sources of this revenue were - the territorial rights which produced 326,000 purses; the poll-tax, which gave 4,747 on the inhabitants of Cairo, and 55,206 on those of the provinces; the tax on trade and occupation amounted to 20,000 and the duties on importing provisions into Cairo amounted to 11,500. Yates, "Egypt " Vol. I, p. 121.

** Holroyd says - " Slaves are almost the only article of commerce from Abyssinia to Soodan, upon which a monopoly does not exist. In all parts of the country south of New Dongola, the indigo plant thrives most luxuriantly but the Fellah is loathe to grow it because it is one of the articles upon the list of monopolies and is produced only by compulsion." Letter to the English Government. English political pamphlets, Vol. 105, p. 25.

1) Yates, " Egypt " passim.

peasants at his own price and had no rival in the sale." The harvests," says Cameron, "were seized and carried to his magazines, to be sold there for the profit of the treasury, and the Pasha became the great merchant of Egypt dealing direct with European buyers."¹ Still he encouraged agriculture in various ways and introduced many formerly unknown plants and trees such as the olive and the mulberry.*

More than half of his vast revenues was spent on his army and navy.² The army was recruited from two sources - (1) by impressment of the Fellaheen; (2) by means of the annual war against the Blacks.³ The Arabs having a natural aversion to military life, maimed themselves in many different ways in order to escape the service, and the Pasha consequently experienced some difficulty in maintaining his large army.⁴ This abuse became so great at one time that Mehemet Ali was bound to issue a proclamation threatening galley service as the punishment for an offense of this kind.⁵ In spite of

these disadvantages in getting recruits, his army was almost

*) "Grâce à lui", says Debibour, "les méthodes de culture s'étaient rapidement perfectionnées. Les races de chevaux et de moutons s'améliorèrent; le murrier et l'olivier furent introduits dans le pays et prospérèrent." Lavisse et Rambaud, "Histoire Générale Vol. X, p. 926.

1) Cameron, "Egypt in the 19th Century" p. 125

2) Yates, "Egypt" Vol. I, p. 121.

3) See chapter 1 of this thesis.

4) Holroyd, Letter to the English Government. English Political Pamphlets, Vol. 105, p. 12.

5) This proclamation is printed in Yates, "Egypt" Vol. I, p. 179.

always in the best of condition. It was organized on the European model and drilled by European officers, according to European discipline.* The mutineers had been weeded out** by sending them to destruction in Arabia and the Soudan and the danger of a military revolt was thus minimized.¹ In 1833 the army consisted of 100,000 regulars and 50,000 irregulars, maintained at a cost of 1,200,000 l.² It was thus, far superior to the daring Mamelukes as well as the fanatical Wahhabys; to the desperate Greek patriots as well as to the well-disciplined Janissaries of the Sultan. The Egyptian navy was in as good condition. As soon as the fleet had been destroyed at Navarino, Mehemet Ali set about building a larger and better one. The naval expenses in 1832 amounted to 400,000 l. The squadron consisted of eight battle ships, fifteen frigates and corvettes with 1300 guns and 12,000 sailors.³

But Mehemet Ali not only applied himself to military and administrative reforms; he was also deeply interested in education. Brehier says, " Pour faire produire au sol

Égyptien toutes ses richesses, pour introduire en Égypte de
 *) Captain Joseph Seve was the most prominent of these foreign officers.

**) " Méhémet Ali avait fondé avec raison sur leur (the Egyptians) bravoure et leur docilité l'espoir de sa puissance et de son agrandissement." Jucherau de St. Denis, " Histoire de L'Empire Ottoman." Vol. IV, p. 126.

1) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 131.

2) Ibid

3) Ibid

nouvelles cultures, pour établir un commerce fructueux avec l'Européen il aurait fallu que une lente éducation vînt détruire la routine invétérée des fellahs et modifiât entièrement leur nature en leur donnant le goût de l'initiative.¹ For this reason he established schools of all sorts, technical as well as general.* They were, however, very unpopular at first and the students had to be paid to attend them.² The instructors were chiefly foreigners although some natives were employed. The students that were graduated from these states school were often sent to France, England and Austria to complete their education.

Mehemet Ali also paid much attention to the industrial development of Egypt. He was particularly active in fostering

* Following is a list of schools of Egypt given by Holroyd in his letter to the English government. "English Political Pamphlets," Vol. 105 p. 9.

Number of Pupils	Schools	By whom managed
400	The School of Infantry Officers	Damietta - French Officer
300	" " Cavalry	" Geezah - Col. Varin (French)
300	" " Artillery	at Toorah - An Arab
180	" " Engineers	" Boolaq - An Armenian
740?	Marine School	" Alexandria - A Turk.
200?	School of Medicine	at Kasserelaine - Duvignon (French)
120	" " Agriculture	- Zagazig - An Armenian
200	" " Interpreters	- An Arab of French Education
160	" " Music	at Hanka " " " "
140	" " for Accountants	at Setteznob - An Arab
20	" " Weighers	at Boolaq - Arab of French Education
10	" " Engravers	" " " " "
20	" " Miners	
12	Midwives' School	
100?	Veterinary School	Schoobra - Amand (A Frenchman)
1400	Preparatory School	at Abouzable - An Arab
10000	Fifty Primary Schools	- All directed by Arabs.
14402		

1) Brehier, "L'Égypte de 1798 à 1900" p. 108.

2) Holroyd, Letter to English Government, English Political

the native industries¹ in order to make Egypt independent of Europe for its military supplies and to enable her to compete with Europe in silk and cotton manufactured goods.² The lack of coal and iron doomed his hopes to failure. He maintained his factories for several years at a loss, but finally discovering them impracticable he abandoned them.* By his strict maintenance of order he encouraged commerce. The canal of Mahmoud connecting Alexandria with Cairo was constructed in his reign.³ In all these ways he improved Egypt, and Europe once more looked on it with respect.

We ought to consider, however, one more interest of Mehemet Ali before taking up the diplomatic struggle. This is his social policy. He had a veritable mania for foreigners.⁴ He invited them to his court, entertained them and tried to ingratiate himself with them in every way. Hundreds of Europeans came to his court and on their return sang the praises of the wonderful man of the Nile. But as his reputation of hospitality grew, scores of adventurers flocked to his court to take advantage of his good will. This abuse at length became so great that he was forced to issue the following proclamation.⁵ " From the fifteenth of January

 *) Yates says -" The only benefit resulting was the clearing of a horrible district of Cairo, notorious for murders and the most degrading vices." Egypt, Vol. I, p. 510.

1) Yates, Egypt " Vol. I, p. 510.

2) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 126.

3) Lavisse, et Rambaud, " Histoire Générale " Vol. 10, p. 926.

4) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 128.

5) Yates, " Egypt " Vol. I. p. 198.

1836 every individual coming to Egypt for the purpose of establishing himself, will be required, on his first arrival to show that he has the means of existence, and exhibit to the local government, a guarantee from among the principal inhabitants of the country, who will be responsible for his moral conduct. Every individual already established in Egypt, must in like manner, take measures to fulfil the conditions required by the preceding article. Every captain of a vessel who shall bring as passengers, persons unable to give the securities required, shall be obliged at his own risk and peril, to convey them back to Europe." Mehemet Ali's star was on the rise and his prestige was spread far and near.

Mehemet had raised Egypt out of a condition of anarchy and transformed it into a land of wealth, order, and prosperity; he had organized an army that he might well be proud of; he had reformed the finances so that his treasury was always well filled; by his ardent championship of Mohammedanism and by his marvellous conquests he had extended his prestige to all the Ottoman provinces in many of which it was far more effective than that of the Sultan; finally he had demonstrated to Europe in all possible ways, the fitness of Egypt for absolute independence.

In 1832 he decided to go to war with Turkey. The causes of his determination were three: (1) The attitude of

the Sultan in withholding from Mehemet Ali the rewards for his aid during the Greek revolution. The Sultan during this insurrection, being at the end of his resources had been forced to call upon Mehemet Ali for support. For this aid, the Sultan in despair had agreed to bestow upon him the pashaliks of Damascus and Syria as well as the Morea.¹⁾ The Egyptian troops rapidly put down the revolt, but unfortunately, just when Mehemet Ali was ready to grasp the fruits of his labors, Europe interfered and they were lost. Stratford Canning suggested to the Porte, that the pashalik of Acre be given to Mehamet Ali in spite of his ultimate failure;² But the Sultan fearing that his vassal was already too powerful, objected on the grounds that Mehemet Ali had not carried out his part of the contract - namely the reduction and restoration of Greece to Turkey.³

The second complaint against the Sultan was the installment^{of} Khusrev Pasha in the most powerful position in the central government. Khusrev, it will be remembered was the governor of Egypt whom Mehemet Ali had forced to flee for his life. This man had never forgotten his humiliation and was always entertaining plans of revenge. Mehemet Ali complained of Khusrev's conduct during the Greek war, charging him with treasonable behavior.* He accused him

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1) C. M. H. Vol. 10, p. 548.

2) Cameron, "Egypt in the 19th Century" p. 147.

3) C. M. H. Vol 10, p. 548.

*) See foot-note on other page.

of entertaining designs against Egypt and against himself in particular.¹ Nor was Mehemet unjustified in his complaints. The Seraskier** was in fact doing all in his power to bring about the downfall of his rival. Mahmoud too was not averse to Khusrev's schemes. He feared Mehemet as a dangerous rival and was not unwilling to give his sanction to any plans that had in view the destruction of his powerful vassal. Mehemet was aware of the attitude of the Ottoman court towards him and believed that the Sultan was only delaying his attack on Egypt until "the reform of the Ottoman army should give a reasonable prospect of overthrowing him."²

The third cause of the war was his desire for independence.

He realized that the best way of maintaining his position was

 *) " Der Sultan und ich, wenn Treu verbunden und redlich zusammenwirkend, haben keinen Feind und keine Zukunft zu Furchten. Aber welche ist die haltung des Sultans? Ich habe ihn das Werk vieler Jahre, Herr und Flotte gegeben, uber dies meinen Sohn, demselben, der ihm Arabien zu Fussen legte; - er aber hat durch Chosrew Pascha die Siege meines Sohnes zu vergeblichen gemacht, und ist mein Sohn nicht zu Grunde gegangen, wahrlich, das verdienst Chosrew Pascha ist es nicht. Was sind die Griechen? Sie verwusteten ihr Land and Chosrewi Pasha war nie zur stelle, wo wir der unerlasslichen, uns zu gesicherten Zufuhren bedurften. Mit diesen Feinde und Verrather will ich nichts mehr zu tuhn haben. Nahres liegt mir am Herzen mein eigenes Land " Prokesch-Osten, " Mehmed Ali, " p. 7.

**) This was the title of the commander-in-chief of the army under the Sultan. Khusrev was holding the position at this time.

1) Prokesch-Osten, " Mehmed Ali " p. 6.

2) C. M. H. Vol. X, p. 549.

by making conquests. He knew also that he could hardly expect to achieve his independence without giving up something.¹ In case of such negotiations he did not want to give up part of Egypt. What would better suit his purpose than Syria?

Since he must go to war why not do so before Turkey had a chance to recuperate from her wars with Russia and Greece? What more opportune moment than the present to realize his ambitions, while the European Powers were fully occupied with the problems arising from the revolutionary movements of 1830? Then too he could be almost certain of the aid of France who had recently approached him with propositions of alliance against Algiers and was still anxious for his friendship.²

With the advantages apparently all on his side he decided to act. He did not have to look far for a pretext. His petty quarrel with Abdullah, Pasha of Acre, would serve his purpose admirably. The latter, whom Mehemet had saved from death for treason against the Porte, by paying a heavy ransom³ refused to permit the transportation of Egyptian manufactured goods to Mesopotamia and the East through his

*) France and England had their hands full in dealing with Belgians; Spain was still in a restless condition; while Russia was exerting all her energy in putting down the revolt in Poland.

1) Malortie, "Egypt" p. 34.

2) Cameron, Egypt in the 19th Century, " p. 148.

3) Ibid

province.* Furthermore this province of Abdullah was the basis of Kushrev's intrigues against Egypt.¹ Finally, Abdullah had rejected** Mehemet's request to drive back the large bands of peasants who were emigrating from lower Egypt to seek an assylum free from oppression in Syria. The two Pashas appealed to the Sultan at the same time,² Mehemet Ali petitioning*** him to grant his requests³ in regard to Egyptian emigration; and Abdullah defending the position he had taken in the matter. With Khusrev in power there was little chance that Mehemet Ali would receive a favorable reply. The Porte responded " that the governor of one

province could not make himself the censor and disciplinarian

*) Prokesch-Osten says, - " Was endlich die vier Bezirke betraf, so waren mir die oft wiederholten Klagen des Vice-Königs gegen den Pascha von St. Jean d'Acre bekannt, der von den Engländer gewonnen, den Agyptischen Fabrikserzeugnissen der Durchzug nach Mesopotamien verweigerte" Mehmed Ali p. 9.

**) Abdullah was probably justified in his refusal because of Mehemet's proud and arrogant demeanour towards his neighboring Pashas. Jucherau de St. Denis says - " Méhémet Ali commença par se montrer prétentieux, fier et prépondérant envers tous les Pashas de son voisinage et particulièrement à l'égard de ceux de la Syrie: Prenant avec sa Pasha un ton à peu près semblable à celui d'un souverain vis-à-vis de son vassal, Méhémet Ali prescrivit à Abdulla plusieurs dispositions humiliantes et désagréables pour un homme que se croyait son égal." Histoire de L'Empire Ottoman Vol. IV, p. 128.

***) Mehemet promised to pay the Sultan 4,000,000 Spanish dollars to help in paying of the Russian war debts, providing the Sultan granted the petition. The Sultan refused both the gift and the petition. Prokesch-Osten "Mehmed Ali," p. 17

1) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century," p. 149.

2) Jucherau de St. Denis, " Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman," Vol IV, p. 129.

3) Cameron. " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 150.

of a neighboring governor, without trenching on the prerogatives of sovereignty;"¹ and that the Egyptians were neither his private slaves nor bound to the soil and as such could settle where they pleased without the permission of the Pasha of Egypt.² But Mehemet had no intention of obeying this letter from Khusrev and replied in vague language, meanwhile continuing his preparation for a Syrian campaign.³

In October 1831 Mehemet raised an army of 20,000 men * with which Ibrahim invaded Syria. Gaza and Jaffa submitted without resistance and after a delay of several days the army marched ^{on} towards Acre, the stronghold of Abdullah.⁴ Meanwhile a squadron of several vessels was sent to Haiffa with the ammunition, food supplies, and siege artillery. Here the Egyptian army and navy met and began their attack on Acre which had so gloriously repelled the great Napoleon. Acre once in Ibrahim's hands it would be easy to subdue all Syria. But the city was well fortified, amply provisioned and contained 3,000 soldiers. The siege began November 27, 1831,⁵ but was not effectively maintained until some months later after the neighboring inhabitants had been subdued and after the Druzes of Lebanon had taken up the Egypt-

*) C. M. H. and Cameron give 11,000 as the size of the army. 20,000 are the figures given by Prokesch-Osten.

1) Paton, *Egyptian Revolutions* " Vol.II, p. 94.

2) Cameron, *" Egypt in the 19th Century "* p. 150.

3) Jucherau, de St. Denis, *" Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman "* Vol. IV, p. 129.

4) Paton, *" Egyptian Revolutions "* Vol. II, p. 95.

5) Yates, *" Egypt "* Vol. II, p. 421.

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ian cause. On May 27, 1832 the fortress that had defied Bonaparte surrendered to Ibrahim. A few weeks later Damascus opened its gates to him.¹ Up to the month of May the Sultan had considered the matter in the light of a mere dispute between two of his vassals.* But on seeing the Pasha of Egypt continue his advance in Syria in spite of all his protests, he decided to make the cause of Abdullah his own. So on May 2nd he issued a proclamation deposing Mehemet Ali from the governments of Egypt, Crete and Abyssinia and appointing Hussein Pasha as Mehemet's successor.² Forty-five thousands troops were immediately put under Hussein's command and the army assembled at Adana.

Meanwhile Ibrahim continued his advance. The native people rose in his favor and hailed him as a hero; the Christians looked to him as the champion of their rights against the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Court; the peasants hoped from him the amelioration of their bad condition while the Arabs welcomed him as the leader of a purely

*) Mehemet Ali himself declared the dispute to be such. Jucherau de St. Denis, says - " Ne cessant pas de montrer par ses paroles et ses écrits le plus profond respect pour la Sultan Mahmoud, mais prétendant que tous les ministres de la Porte, entre autres Koshrew Pasha, étaient ses ennemis personnels Méhémet Ali résolut de continuer à agir hostilement contre le divan de Constantinople, et déclara qu'il ne s'arrêterait que lorsqu'il aurait reçu une satisfaction convenable. La satisfaction qu'il désirait était la concession entière des quatre pashaliks de la Syrie. " Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, Vol. IV, p.130.

1) C. M. H. Vol. X, p. 549.

2) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 152.

Arabic movements against the Türk.¹ Flushed with the glory of his triumph, secure in his communications, he reached Homs before the Turkish troops there had received their expected reinforcements, and inflicted on them a crushing defeat.² The commissariat stores, thirty-six guns and 2,000 prisoners were taken. The blame for this defeat should be put on the shoulders of Khusrev; it was he, who unsuccessful in his attempt to secure the command of the Turkish army which he had drilled, deciding that no other person should reap the fruits of his labors, caused a fatal delay in the sending of reinforcements. On the news of the defeat of Homs the army of Hussein disbanded and fled. A stand was made at Aleppo and at Beylen, but the victorious march of the Egyptian troops could not be checked.

Hussein was now recalled and Rashid Pasha* appointed in his place. Khusrev who had again asked for the position and had again been refused, again decided to pursue an anti-Turkish policy. The Egyptian troops left Syria and entered Asia Minor. The road to Constantinople was open to them. Would the Powers now allow Mehemet Ali to take this ancient capital which Europeans had in times past defended against any and every invader? Most of the European governments

 *) Rashid Pasha was the General who had coöperated with Ibrahim in the Greek war of independence.

1) C. M. H. Vol. X, p. 550.

2) Paton, " Egyptian Revolutions " Vol. II, p. 97.

were busy in other parts of the world. Russia however encouraged the Porte to reject any demands which Mehemet Ali might make.¹ Metternich still true to his old doctrines exerted his power to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.* But no unity of action could be secured. England looked down upon Mehemet Ali as a selfish adventurer coveting the throne of the Sultan.** France as the traditional friend of the Egyptian Pasha did not want to see him crushed. Thus because of the lack of unanimity among the Powers as to what policy they ought to pursue Ibrahim was permitted to continue his march towards the Bosphorus with practically no opposition. The Porte hampered by Khusrev's spiteful attitude² towards Rashid Pasha, the commander-in-chief

finally, collected an army of about 50,000 ill-trained troops

*) Metternich declared Austria's policy in a letter addressed to Newman in London, dated February 1833. "The existence and preservation of the Ottoman Porte, whatever anomalies it may present in many respects with Christian civilization, are a common benefit for Europe, and in a special political necessity for Austria." *Memoirs*, No. 1093.

**) "Diese (England) aber, durch den Instinct seines Interesses geleitet, wollte aus europäischen Anschauungen nicht heraus, sah in Mehmed Ali nur einen ehrgeizigen Vasallen, nach dem Throne der Sultane lustern, und unterschätzte dessen Kräfte mit dem Dunkel der weit überwiegenden Macht der Pforte." Prokesch-Osten, *Mehmed Ali*, p. 18.

Stratford Canning actually asked his government to aid the Porte but Lord Grey replied that there were no ships. Cameron, "Egypt in the 19th Century" p. 158.

1) Prokesch-Osten, - "Mehmed Ali" p. 18.

2) Cameron, "Egypt in the 19th Century" p. 155.

to defend the road to Constantinople.¹ The armies met at Konieh on December 21st 1832.² After a few minutes of fighting during which Rashid was captured the Turkish army took to flight leaving 7,000 prisoners in the hands of Ibrahim. Ibrahim thus was not only master of Syria and Asia Minor, but he held Constantinople in his power.

Russia only waited for a moment such as this to offer her services to the Sultan. Mouravieff was sent to Constantinople and offered Mahmoud a Russian squadron of five men-of-war and seven frigates.² France however, did not look with favor upon this scheme of Russia which put the Ottoman Empire under her protection. But France had no ambassador at the Porte and the charge d'affaire M. de Varennes had no definite instructions as to the policy he was to pursue.³ The latter however resolved that something must be done to counteract the growing influence of Russia. He knew that Mehemet Ali was not opposed to treating with the Turks. Taking advantage of this conciliatory attitude, M. de Varennes urged the Porte to make an arrangement with the Pasha and "supported by the Reis Effendi, by the secret inclinations of several members of the Divan and by the discontent prevailing in Constantinople,"⁴ Halil Pasha was sent to Egypt to open negotiations with Mehemet Ali on the basis of the

1) Paton, "Egyptian Revolutions," Vol. II, p. 99.

2) Blanc, "History of Ten Years" Vol. II, p. 201

3) Ibid

4) Ibid

cession of the pashaliks of Siden, Jerusalem, Nablous, and Tripoli. Mehemet Ali objected to this basis and insisted upon Syria and Adana.* Meanwhile however he had ordered Ibrahim to halt at Kutaya. The Sultan clutching the last straw, again solicited the aid of Russia in spite of the objections of Khusrev.¹ France not willing to see Russia with such an easy triumph sent Admiral Roussin to Constantinople as her ambassador. He arrived there February 17 th 1833 and immediately protested, demanding that the Russian squadron which had by this time arrived be sent back.² Mahmoud not daring to refuse outright the request of the French ambassador, but still less daring to leave Constantinople unprotected, merely ordered the fleet to remove to Sezopoli a harbor not very far from the capital. Roussin now with a full concurrence of the British charge d'affairs,³ signed an agreement with the Sultan pledging** his governments to bring Mehemet Ali to accept the Sultan's conditions which were practically those that Halil Pasha had proposed to

*) A courier was at the same time despatched to Ibrahim requesting him to stop his advance. Ibrahim replied "Je m'y arreterai, conformément au desir de mon père et bienfaiteur, jusqu'à ce que je reçoive de sa part un ordre à ce sujet." De Testa, Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottoman, Vol. II, p. 356.

**) Baron Roussin denied in a letter to Mehemet Ali the charge that he had assured the Porte that Mehemet would submit. De Testa, "Traités" Vol. II, p. 360.

1) Cameron, "Egypt in the 19th Century," p. 163.

2) Annual Register, 1833, p. 290.

3) C. M. H. Vol. X, p. 552.

Mehemet, provided the Russian fleet were withdrawn.¹ The plan unfortunately failed. The Pasha of Egypt backed by Minaut² the French consul-general at Alexandria who believed in the aggrandizement of Egypt at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and was thus following a policy directly opposed to that of Roussin, rejected the suggestions or rather demands of the latter. Mehemet Ali in giving his reply he said, - " I have in my favor the whole nation. It only rests with me to raise up Roumelia and Anatolia. United with my nation I could effect much. Master of so many countries, victorious at all points, when I heard the organs of public opinion decree to me the possession of all Syria, I retarded the march of my troops with the sole view of sparing a useless effusion of blood and consulting the disposition of European policy. In recompense for this, and for the moderation which I have shown, and after so many sacrifices for a nation which has supported me, which has united itself with me, and enabled me to obtain so many victories - to demand of me now the abandonment of the country which I occupy and that I shall withdraw my army into a small province composed of four districts, is not this, pronouncing a sentence of political death?"³ Orders were then sent to

1) Blanc, " History of Ten Years," Vol. II, p. 203.

2) Ibid p. 203

3) The original reply can be found in De-Testa " Traites " Vol. II, p. 371. This translation is taken from the Annual Register 1833 p. 291.

Ibrahim to continue his march on Constantinople. Both France and England now urged the Porte to give way to Mehemet Ali and they were successful. On March 29, 1832 Mandeville, the English ambassador, wrote Ibrahim* to cease hostilities since the Sublime Porte had expressed its willingness to confer on Mehemet Ali the whole of Syria with the cities of Aleppo and Damascus.¹ The Porte sent Rashid Bey, who was accompanied by M. de Varannes, to negotiate with Ibrahim.² Meanwhile the Czar had sent a second fleet and disembarked an army of 8,000 men near the Bosphorus³. The Sultan hesitated a moment in regard to recalling Rashid Pasha, but finally decided to let the negotiators proceed. On the arrival of the two envoys at the camp of Ibrahim, Rashid Pasha was contemptuously received and most of the negotiations were carried on with Varennes. Rashid at first was in favor of offering to Ibrahim only the Pashaliks proposed by Halil but ~~the~~ Varennes rejected the suggestion immediately as being impolitic and having too much of an insulting appearance. Ibrahim on his part would hear of no terms except those promised by Mandeville. On these terms, peace was made. On April 15th, Ibrahim and Mehemet Ali were publicly confirmed in the following Pashaliks :⁴

 *) The response of Ibrahim was - " My retreat is the best answer I can make for that you (M. de Varennes) can carry to the English minister.

1) De Testa, " Traites " Vol. II, p. 273.

2) Blanc, " History of Ten Years " p. 206.

3) Ibid p. 206.

4) De Testa, " Traites " Vol. II, p. 377.

Pashaliks	Pashas
- - - - -	- - - - -
Abyssinia with the Sandjao of Jedda and the Cheikhul Naremlik of Mecca	Ibrahim
Egypt	Mehemet Ali
Aleppo	" "
Safet, Sidon, and Beirut	" "
Tripoli of Syria	" "
Crete with the military command of the fortress of Candia	" "
Jerusalem, Nablous, Canea and Retimo	" "

By a firman dated May 5th 1833, the Sultan announced his resolution of creating the office of mohassilik or the collector general of the taxes for the district of Adana, and appointed Ibrahim to the position.¹

Russia who had so generously offered^{her aid} to the Sultan, who had sent a fleet to the Bosphorus and mobilized an army near the seat of Ibrahim's activities to be at the disposal of the Sultan, was not willing now to withdraw them again without receiving a reward for her troubles. On May 5th Count Orloff arrived at Constantinople as ambassador extraordinary with the most extensive powers.² He refused to evacuate Turkish territory until Ibrahim had crossed the Taurus mountains. The latter complied with the request

1) De Testa, " Traité " Vol. II, p. 378.

2) Annuaire Historique Universel 1833, p. 45.

and the Russians then embarked for Russian territory. During his stay however, Orloff negotiated a secret treaty with the Sultan which was signed on July 8th at Unkiar Skelessi. This treaty placed Turkey in the position of a Russian protectorate. The provisions were as follows: (1) the establishment of a defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey; (2) the confirmation of the treaty of Adrianople, the convention of 1830 at St. Petersburg and the arrangement of 1832 at Constantinople regarding the affairs of Greece; (3) the disposition to the Sultan of a sufficient number of Russian troops and ships in case the integrity of the Ottoman Empire were threatened; (4) the limitation of the treaty to a period of eight years; (5) the agreement that in case of Russian defensive war, the Czar would not call upon the Sultan for his navy and army on condition that the latter closed the Straits of the Dardanelles to every battleship which should attempt to enter them, whatever the pretext.¹

France and England later vehemently objected to the treaty claiming that it ought not to have been made without their knowledge. It gave Russia enormous advantages in case of war with a European power; It indeed "annihilated the political independence"² of Turkey. But these pretexts as well as those of the other powers failed to bring about

1) Noradounghian, "Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de L'Empire Ottoman," Vol. II, No. 75.

2) Annuaire Historique Universel 1833, p. 456.

a repeal. The treaty was confirmed by the two contracting governments and remained a continual source of fear to the Western Powers.

Chapter IV

MEHEMET ALI AND THE EUROPEAN POWERS.

Mehemet Ali by the treaty of Kutaya had gained an increase to his territories equal to five times the size of Egypt.¹ This land had to be organized; but that was no easy task with a territory containing so many distinct and hostile populations as did Syria.² Mehemet Ali who had never known any other government than that of the centralized, tyrannical system of Egypt, naturally applied it to Syria. Herein is where he made his first great mistake. When he first took possession the people hailed him as a saviour; they soon saw their mistake. On the other hand, Mehemet soon discovered that he was not dealing with the docile fellaheen. The population was proud and war-like and loved freedom; they consequently grumbled loudly against the Pasha's oppression.³ But the Egyptian system was not applied with equal severity to all parts of the Empire. Thus Paton remarks, that "the Egyptian government used a reasonable courtesy towards the comparatively speaking, wealthy aristocracy of Damascus; but to the general population their attitude was that of masters. They nevertheless were hated and feared by the local in-

1) Cameron, "Egypt in the 19th Century", p. 167.

2) Paton, "Egyptian Revolutions" Vol. II, Ch. IX.

3) Duggan, "Eastern Problems" Ch. I.

fluent families."¹ Some reforms however, were introduced and maintained throughout the Egyptian domination. Among these were the equality of religion before the law, and the establishment of divans composed of both Christians and Mohammedans in all the cities of a certain specified population.² But these beneficial social and civil reforms did not offset the introduction of the system of monopoly and conscription. Mehemet believed that the amount of his revenues depended upon the number of his monopolies. This principle therefore was taken from Egypt with scarcely any change and applied to Syria. The same may be said of conscription. Both caused wide-spread sufferings; but still the people did not revolt. Mehemet paid no attention to the growing discontent and ordered Ibrahim to impose a general poll-tax and carry out the disarmament of the people.³ They would endure no more and in 1834 Palestine rose in a revolt so serious, that Mehemet Ali was forced to go in person to his son's aid. The rebellion spread rapidly and was put down only after thousands had been slain in cold blood. After Syria was once more subdued, the tyranny became greater than ever and thousands of natives fled to other provinces. Ibrahim himself was inclined toward peace,⁴ but his father holding his realm by "right of might" had

1) Paton, "Egyptian Revolutions" Vol. II, p. 111,

2) C. H. M. Vol. X, p. 559.

3) Paton, "Egyptian Revolutions" Vol. II, p. 122.

4) Cameron, "Egypt in the 19th Century" p. 172.

to maintain his army in order to maintain himself.

Much of this discontent was stirred up by agents of the Turkish government directly employed by Khusrav Pasha.* When the Syrian insurrection first broke out, Mahmoud wished to intervene actively and was only checked by the refusal of the Powers to permit the Eastern Question to come to the front again. Mehemet in turn refused to pay tribute to the Sultan which he knew would be used against himself.¹ In the fall of 1834 he even went so far as to declare openly his intentions of securing independence and sounded various powers as to the attitude they would pursue.² It is

 *) " Aber unter den bestehenden Verhältnissen konnte Unzufriedenheit im Lande nicht fehlen. Die Neuerungen des Vize-Königs in allen Zweigen der Verwaltung, die strengere Handhabung der Befehle, die Zuziehung der Einwohner zu öffentlichen Arbeiten, die genauere Einhebung der Abgaben, vor allem die Einreihung der Söhne in die Truppen Ibrahim's, zu der die Rustungen der Pforte, nothigten, begegneten vielem Widerstande und überall waren es Werkzeuge der Pforte, welche des Namens des Sultans sich bedienend, Auflehnung predigten um Mittel und Hilfspengaben. Auch die Anhänger Abdullah Pasha's vormaligen Statthalters von Akka, regten mit Geld und Versprechungen das Gebirge von Naplous von Chali - Bahman und Jerusalem zum Aufstande auf. "

Prokesch-Osten, " Mehmed Ali " p. 60.

1) C. M. H., Vol. X, p. 560.

2) Blanc, " History of Ten Years " Vol. II, p. 596.

necessary therefore to examine the attitude of the Powers to the Egyptian Question.

Let us look at Russia. Her policy in regard to Egypt could not be the same as her policy in regard to Greece. It is true, that both Greece and Egypt were provinces of Turkey and both were aiming at independence, yet other conditions were so dissimilar that a different policy was necessary. In the first place, the revolt in Greece was of a Christian people of whom Russia was a protector; the revolt of Egypt was of a Mohammedan people with whom the Czar would have little sympathy. In the second place, the revolt in Greece was an uprising of a national people for independence and against the oppression of the dominant Turk; the revolt in Egypt on the other hand was the rebellion of an ambitious man, anxious to make himself independent in name as well as in fact. The natural thing for Russia to do was to fall back to her old traditional policy of keeping the Sultan as weak as possible. Russia had always hoped to establish herself some day in Constantinople,¹ and have an access to the Mediterranean. She indeed enjoyed the navigation of the Black Sea but the movement of her war ships from the Black to the Mediterranean depended entirely upon the good-will of Turkey. She had temporarily surmounted that difficulty however by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. She hoped to make this temporary control of the

1) Gaignerot, La Question d ' Egypt " p. 30.

Dardanelles, permanent. To accomplish this however, she must keep Turkey weak and dependent. It was therefore her policy to allow Mehemet Ali to remain just strong enough to be a continual danger to the Porte. The Czar Nicholas was said to have remarked, that " he would have no objection to the establishment of an independent Arab empire, which by dividing the Mussulman world, might more than counter-balance the danger accruing from Turkey."¹ England indeed believed that Russia was even aiding Mehemet Ali.²

England feared Russia in 1830 for the same reasons that she had in 1820 - as a danger to the balance of Europe, and as a danger to English interests in Asia.³ Her policy therefore remained the same. She opposed anything that would increase Russia's prestige or territory. She was strongly opposed to the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and for the same reason opposed the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Looking at the question either way, whether Mehemet were successful or unsuccessful, England would be the loser.⁴ If he were able to secure his independence, Turkey, in a most deplorable condition, would be absolutely defenceless against Russian schemes of aggrandizement. If he were defeated it would be by Russian troops, called in according to the provisions of Unkir Skelessi and the Czar

would certainly not throw away the opportunity to extend -

1) Malortie, " Egypt " p. 52.

2) C. M. H. Vol. X, p. 558.

3) See chapter II.

4) Blanc, " History of Ten Years " Vol. II, Ch. 14.

his interests. If Mehemet could have defeated both the Russians and the Turks and established himself on the Sultan's throne at the head of a strong empire, he would have placed Turkey in a position to strike bargains with Russia against French and English interests in the East.* England's fear of Russia therefore was the first reason for opposing Mehemet Ali. There was another reason however, a commercial one. Mehemet's manufacturing enterprises and his commercial activities perchance might make Egypt a successful competitor of England. England could not endure a commercial rival and therefore could not endure the Pasha of Egypt.¹ Furthermore, in 1838 Bulwer had made a commercial treaty with Turkey by which all import duties were to be increased from three per cent to five per cent and all export duties from three per cent to twelve per cent; but all other duties or taxes on imports or exports, as well as all monopolies and other things of a similar^{character} were to be abolished and the treaty was to be applied throughout the whole Turkish Empire.² Egypt being practically independent did not enforce the treaty and Mehemet Ali's monopolies remained in a flourishing

*) Malortie attempts to answer this argument by pointing out that an independent Egypt in order to maintain its revenues must keep up the commerce passing through its territory. Most of this consisted of English goods bound for India. The friendship of England therefore, was essential to her financial welfare. "Egypt" p. 35.

1) Malortie, "Egypt" p. 48.

2) British State and Foreign Papers, Vol. XXVIII, p. 408.

condition.¹ The English government's animosity towards Mehemet Ali therefore grew stronger. There was still another reason for England's Egyptian policy. This was the French-English rivalry in the East and the fear lest France having Mehemet Ali as a protegee, might be able to control the approaches to India and threaten Great Britain's Asiatic colonies and commerce.² England decided to be prepared against any emergency and in 1834 sent Col. Campbell to Alexandria to look after British affairs. In April, 1834, Palmerston wrote to Temple, " Our policy in the Levant is to remain prepared." ³ England's interests unquestionably lay in maintaining Turkish integrity.

Not so with France however. Although France had been for many years an ally of Turkey, when it came to the Egyptian question she changed her attitude. France looked on Egypt^{as} sometime due to ^{fall} into her possession. It was a tradition. As far back as Louis XIV's reign, Leibnitz had urged a conquest of Egypt to distract^{attention} from the Rhine.⁴ D'Argenson again suggested the scheme in 1738. Some years later Choiseul proposed to Louis XV to retrieve his losses during the Seven Years War by annexing Egypt.⁵ In 1786 Egypt was assigned to France in the scheme of partition drawn up by Catherine of Russia and Joseph II of Austria

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- 1) Hansard, " Parliamentary Debates " Vol. 59, p. 628.
 - 2) Resener, " Ägypten unter Englischer Okkupation " p. 5
 - 3) Bulwer, " Life of Palmerston " Vol. II, p. 183.
 - 4) Fournier, " Napoleon I," p. 113.
 - 5) Dennis, " Eastern Problems " p. 177.

for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.¹ The annexation of Egypt was several times discussed by the Directory (1795-1796) and was in Napoleon's mind for a year or more, before his Egyptian campaign in 1798. The great importance which Napoleon attached to the East is seen by his insistence on England completely evacuating Malta in 1803, the refusal of which resulted in the renewal of war between the two countries.* But the French had another claim to Egypt. This was their work done in developing the land. Milner says, - " Frenchmen may claim to have been the pioneers of European influence. Whatever Egypt borrowed from Europe, whether in the material or the intellectual sphere, came to her first through French channels. Her upper classes, if educated at all were educated by Frenchmen in French ideas. French even became an official language, side by side with Arabic." ² In 1833 France more so than any other government supported Mehemet Ali. Thus Metternich wrote to Prokesch-Osten, " We do not accuse France of having excited Mehemet to rebel; but had not France continuously assisted him in every way, the Pasha would have possessed neither the requisite strength nor daring, to throw himself into an enterprise which while its success might have appeared probable

 *) Rose says, - " Malta was the only effectual bar to a French seizure of Egypt or an invasion of Turkey from the side of Corfu. With Turkey partitioned, Egypt in French hands there would be no security against Napoleon's designs in India. " *Life of Napoleon I* " Vol. I, p. 388.

1) Leger, " Austro-Hungary " p. 392.

2) Milner, " England in Egypt " p. 341.

from the weakness of the Porte would necessarily be sure to involve him in grave complications with more than one power of the first rank." ¹

Austria of course, by her geographical position with respect to Turkey feared the dissolution of the empire and the encroachments of Russia. She also was naturally opposed to increasing the strength of France by giving her the control of Egypt. Add to this Metternich's aversion to revolution, and Austria's attitude ² in the coming struggle can be plainly seen.

Prussia was less vitally interested in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire than any of the other great Powers. ³ She however remained true to the policy she had adopted during the early years of the Greek revolution - that is a policy of maintaining the Ottoman territories intact, so as not increase the strength of her neighbors, so as to prevent a great European war, and finally so as to give no encouragement to revolution. In this struggle then, Russia and France were separately working towards dismemberment; while Austria, England and Prussia devoted their efforts to the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. The natural thing for the two former to have done would have been to form an alliance. This however was impossible

1) Metternich, "Memoirs" No. 1094.

2) Ibid No. 1094.

3) Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe" Ch. 9.

because of the part France had taken in the Polish revolution and of Czar Nicholas' contempt for and hostility to the French King Louis Philippe.

~~Nap. III.~~

France, England and Austria on receiving Mehemet's first intimation of declaring his independence at the head of a great Mohammedan state disapproved of it. But Mehemet was not discouraged. The Sultan was preparing to oust his ambitious rival from his possessions. Mehemet knew that if he was to remain secure in his territories he had to get the Powers to recognize his independence. Then furthermore, he hoped to establish his dynasty as the ruler of Egypt in order that his works might be lasting. So in May 1838, he again declared his intentions of becoming independent.* This time his plans were ^{not} nearly so grandiose, and the vast Mohammedan empire narrowed itself down to the territory of Egypt. But Europe was inflexible. Lord Palmerston answered the declaration thus: " The Cabinet

*) The declaration was made to M. Cochelet, the Consul-General of France and to Col. Campbell the British Consul-General. Mehemet said, - " He was between two swords, his family and the great Powers; that the interests of his children and family imperiously called upon him to fix their future state; that it was with tears in his eyes and an oppressed heart, that he had taken his present resolution from which he would not swerve." Bulwer, "Palmerston " Vol. II. p. 419

yesterday agreed that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare himself independent and to separate Egypt and Syria from the Turkish Empire * * * * * We are prepared to give naval aid to the Sultan against Mehemet if necessary and demanded; and we intend to order our Mediterranean fleet immediately to Alexandria, in order to give Mehemet Ali an outward and visible sign of our inward resolves."¹

Palmerston's¹ opposition was not founded at this time on any dislike of Mehemet personally but rather on the consequences which Mehemet's stand for independence might cause. Thus he says - " It must not be forgotten that the one great danger for Europe is the possibility of a combination between France and Russia which although prevented at present by the personal feelings of the Czar may not always be as impossible as it is now."² But things were approaching a crisis. War was due to break out at any moment. The Powers made a final but futile attempt to prevent it by declaring that the aggressor would be considered in the light of the offender."³ Both sides were prepared; both sides were anxious for war; but both hoped the other would begin hostilities and draw down upon him the odium of European public opinion. Mehemet therefore was greatly

1) Bulwer, " Palmerston " Vol. II, p. 267.

2) Ibid p. 268.

3) Cadalvene, et Barrault, " Deux Années de l'Histoire d'Orient " Vol. I, p. 123.

delighted when he heard that the Turkish troops were advancing. He nevertheless ordered his generals not to make any offensive movement *until they were absolutely sure that the Turks had been the aggressors.¹ On April 21, 1839, the Turkish vanguard crossed the Euphrates near Bir on Mehemet's territory. Mehemet shrewdly declared to the Powers that he would not consider even this movement in the light of a declaration of war, if the Sultan would withdraw his troops.² The Pasha was sure that the Turks would make no retrograde movement and hereby showed his skill as a diplomat. The Turks however, continued to advance and the war was on. The English representatives at Constantinople and at Alexandria wrote conflicting reports

 *) Mehemet Ali wrote September 5th 1838 - " Je ne commettrai point d'hostilités envers le Sultan, et mon voyage au Sennaar en est la meilleur preuve; mais je ne saurais me laisser lier les mains pour devenir la victime de la sorte, et je préférerais succomber plutôt que de laisser le sort de ma famille et de mon peuple indécis. Si je ne parviens pas à force de sollicitations à obtenir ce que je demande; si mes raisons sont repoussées par les grandes puissances; si elles ne veulent m'accorder aucune garantie sur la position future de l'Egypte; si enfin, je suis réduit à moi même, je choisirai les mesures que je crois les plus propres à m'en sortir."

Published by Cadalvene et Barrault, " Deux Années de l'Histoire de l'Orient, " Vol. I, p. 348.

- 1) The Despatch to the generalissimo is published by Cadalvene et Barrault, "Deux Années de l'Histoire d'Orient " Vol. II, p. 125.
- 2) De Testa, " Traités " Vol. IX, p. 323.

as to who was the aggressor.* On June 24th 18³29, the Egyptian's administered a crushing defeat on the Turks at Nezib.¹ Six days later Mahmoud died and Abdul-Mejid, a boy of sixteen, succeeded.

The Ottoman Empire was in an almost hopeless state. If the Powers would not interfere immediately it would certainly fall to pieces. England was the first to take any definite action in this direction. On May 25th 1839, Baron Bourqueney, the chargé d'affaires at London communicated to Marshal Soult, the head of the French ministry, a conversation with Lord Palmerston in which the latter, declaring that it was the common interest of England and France to "defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire against both friends and enemies," proposed a European concert to settle the Eastern question.² The French looked at the problem from two viewpoints: (1) the European (2) the Asiatic. From the former they saw themselves in alliance with England, Prussia, and Austria against the aims of Russia. From the second they saw their plans of keeping Egypt under their influence opposed by Russia, England and Austria. It was their object then to keep

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the European side of the question to the front. France

- * Lord Ponsonby was at Constantinople and encouraged the Turks to hold out against Mehemet Ali. Col. Campbell still represented England at Alexandria and was inclined to take the Egyptian side. Cadalvene et Barrault, Vol I, p 57
- 1) Cadalvene et Barrault, "Deux Années etc." Vol. I, Ch. 6.
- 2) De Testa, "Traité" Vol. II, p. 119.
- 3) Blanc, "History of Ten Years" Vol. II, p. 603.

therefore was unwilling to have the first part of the question settled without securing some benefit from the second and consequently replied to Palmerston in a vague manner.¹ Communications between the two governments were however continued. On June 17, 1839 Baron de Bourquenoy wrote Soult that Palmerston as a result of the deliberations of the Cabinet declared that England ought to be in perfect accord with France and proposed that the two governments take immediate action to stop the conflict in the East and come to some understanding as to a final, irrevocable settlement of the Eastern problem.² France replied to this in a friendly tone but emphasized the interests of Mehemet Ali.³ Two days later Palmerston even went further and suggested a union of the French and English fleets in forcing the Dardanelles in case Russia sent troops to occupy Turkish territory.⁴ France refused to go as far as that and suggested that the permission of the Porte be secured for the occupation of the Marmora by the combined fleets in case of a Russian invasion.⁵ England accepted this counter-proposal, but with some reluctance. In July the French ambassador at Constantinople, Baron de Roussin, was notified of the arrangement. Marshal Soult declared

1) De Testa, " Traité " Vol. II, p. 421.

2) Ibid p. 423

3) Ibid p. 427

4) Ibid p. 429

5) Blanc " History of Ten Years " Vol. II, p. 624.

among other things in this despatch that, " Le jour où l'existence du trône du Sultan serait réellement compromise, elle les trouverait tous disposés à lui accorder leur concours pour prévenir une catastrophe qui, en ébranlant l'équilibre politique mettrait en péril la paix du monde, dont le maintien les intéresse tous au même degré. À Pétersbourg, à Vienne, à Berlin, à Londres, à Paris, il n'y a qu'un sentiment à cette égard."¹

Meanwhile Metternich proposed that the Powers come to some understanding.² Nesselrode remarked that the Powers need entertain no fear with regard to Russia since the latter sincerely believed in Ottoman integrity.³ All declared that their wishes for Turkey were of the best, purest and the most unselfish kind; nevertheless each state feared his neighbor and up to this time absolutely nothing was accomplished.

Abdul-Mejid was on the throne: Khusrev Pasha was again appointed grand-vizier with Halil as Seraskier or war minister;⁴ Both were bad and dishonest characters. Now both of these ministers were the enemies of Ahmet Feozi Pasha, the commander of the Turkish fleet. He dared not return to Constantinople. So declaring to the Admiral of the French squadron that Mahmoud had been murdered by

1) De Testa, " Traités " Vol. II, p. 436.

2) The Despatch to Count Appony at London, June 14, 1839, found in De Testa, " Traités " Vol. IX, p. 343.

3) De Testa " Traités " Vol. IX, p. 346.

4) Cadalvene et Barrault, " Deux Années etc. " Vol. II. p.77.

Khusrev and that under those circumstances it was necessary to sue for peace,¹ he sailed for Alexandria and treasonably delivered the fleet over to Mehemet Ali July 14, 1839.* With the Porte deprived of its fleet and with its army almost annihilated, peace seemed to be near at hand. Indeed Mehemet laid down the conditions on which he would make peace, namely - the hereditary possession of Egypt with that of Syria and of Candia.² The Porte resolved to submit to them and sent two representatives to negotiate with the Pasha. But just before they set out, the Porte was informed by M. de Stürmer, the Austrian internuncio, that the five Powers combined were opposed** to the Porte's making peace with Mehemet Ali without their supervision³ and prayed " the Sublime Porte to await the fruits of their friendly dispositions and to make absolutely no decision whatever in a definitive manner without their cooperation." ⁴ Metternich

*) The fleet consisted of nine battleships, eleven frigates and four brigs containing 21,000 men. Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 180.

**) The causes for this action are given in a letter to Grahville by Marshal Soult. He wrote - " Neither the disastrous defeat of the Turkish army nor the treason of the Capitan Pasha, nor the conquered attitude of the Divan ought to change the attitude of the Powers; that all the arrangements made between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, at a the moment when the ministers of the Empire were paralyzed by fear or planning treason to satisfy their ambition, ought to be considered null and void and that a declaration in that sense ought to be made to Mehemet Ali." De Testa " Traites " Vol. II, p. 458.

1) Blanc, " History of Ten Years " Vol. II, p. 617.

2) De Testa, " Traites " Vol. IX, p. 360.

3) Ibid p. 374.

4) Ibid p. 374.

had given the pledge of Russia to this note without previously getting the consent of that government. This at first caused some trouble but the note was not recalled.

Palmerston now demanded that France take measures against the Pasha of Egypt to secure the restoration of the Turkish fleet but France justly refused.¹ Palmerston then suggested that the Powers coerce Mehemet Ali into submission and restore Syria, Crete and Arabia to the direct government of the Sultan.² Strange to say France who had been the protector of the Egyptian Pasha, up to this time did not protest. Thus Soult wrote to Baron de Bourquency - " without doubt, in the hands of a man like the Pasha of Egypt the possession of such considerable territories must have a dangerous appearance to the Powers of Europe which explains and justifies their efforts in putting an end to his encroachments." ³ On August 22, 1839, the Sublime Porte appealed to the Powers to bring matters to a conclusion since they had been taken out of the Sultan's hands.⁴

England and France meanwhile were falling farther and farther apart. This was to the advantage of Russia and she decided to make the best of the opportunity; so in September M. de Brunow was sent to London to make an arrangement between the two Powers. On September 24, 1839 Brunow

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- 1) De Testa, " Traité " Vol. II, p. 462.
 2) Ibid IX, p. 377.
 3) Ibid II, p. 470
 4) Ibid IX, p. 392.

declared: that the Czar looked forward to the settlement of the Eastern question by a Conference of the five great Powers; that " if the measures of Mehemet Ali should place Constantinople ^{in danger} and render necessary any naval or military operations in the Bosphorus or Asia Minor it should be left to the Czar who would interfere on behalf of the concert and not on the resolve on Russia alone; " and that England would be permitted to undertake whatever was to be done in the Mediterranean and on the coast of Syria, and Egypt.¹ England looked with favor upon this proposition but refused to accept it without some provision being inserted regarding the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Negotiations nevertheless were begun with the other powers. Austria and Prussia both decided in favor of a European Congress.* France held back. French public opinion was strongly on the side of Mehemet Ali and objected to a treaty which did not guarantee

*) Austria's policy at this time is summed up in a letter written by the King of the Belgians to Queen Victoria October 24, 1839 " On the twenty second Prince Metternich came to see me. He was very kind and talked most confidentially about political affairs, particularly the Oriental concerns. The short of his views is this: he wishes that the Powers could be unanimous, as he sees in this the best chance of avoiding measures of violence against the Pasha of Egypt, which he considers dangerous, either as not sufficiently effective, or of a nature to bring on complications most earnestly to be avoided, such as making use of Russian troops.

Austria naturally would like to bring about the best possible arrangement for the Porte, but it will adhere to any agreement or proposition which can be agreed upon by England and France."

Benson, "Letters of Queen Victoria" Vol. I p. 241.

1) Bulwer, " Palmärston " Vol. II, p. 300.

Mehemet's possessions. In the latter part of September Sébastiani, the French ambassador at London, proposed an agreement by which Mehemet was to become hereditary governor of Egypt and Syria, but Palmerston rejected the scheme on the ground that it would not obviate the causes^{of a} future dispute.¹ On October 3rd the French government was notified that England would consent to Mehemet's hereditary possession of the Pashaliks of Egypt and Acre outside of the town and fortress of Acre. This proposition was rejected by France who insisted upon its former proposal.

Meanwhile Russia was doing all in her power to bring England into a stronger alliance with her.² Baron Brunow declared that the inaction of England prevented any advance from being made.³ He suggested that the British government impress upon the Sultan their determination to protect Constantinople, that Admiral Stopford be sent along the coast of Syria to occupy the strategic points and intercept the communications between that country and Egypt; that all Egyptian vessels bearing ammunition be captured and that Ibrahim be ordered not to advance one step from his present position. The question of the Dardanelles however, still prevented an alliance being made for the settlement of the Eastern question.⁴ France did everything in her power to

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- 1) De Testa, " Traité " Vol. IX, p. 417.
 - 2) Cadalvene, et Barrault, " Deux Années etc. " Vol. II, Ch. 15.
 - 3) De Testa, " Traité " Vol. IX, p. 448.
 - 4) Ibid p. 456.

prevent such an alliance. In the early part of 1840 Guizot succeeded Sébastiani at London. The Cabinet of Soult had resigned and Thiers now was prime minister. Negotiations again were resumed, but with little success. On the suggestion of Baron Neumann (May 5th) Palmerston resolved to give way to the point of extending Mehemet's territories to the frontiers of Tripoli and Damascus but Guizot responded that France would never consent to anything short of all Syria. War between the two countries seemed not at all improbable. On March 11, 1840 Palmerston wrote Granville " It would be very unwise to underrate the force of France and the evils of a war with her in a case in which she had the national interests and a just cause; but it would be equally inexpedient to be daunted by big words and empty vapping in a case in which a calm view of things ought to convince one that France alone would be the sufferer by a war hastily, capriciously and unjustly undertaken by herself." ¹

In England public opinion was not by a long ways all on Palmerston's side. There was much opposition shown in all parts. In Parliament Mr. Hume said on March 17, 1840, " The erroneous policy of the noble lord has in fact put the people of England to an actual expense of between five and six hundred thousand pounds, and at the same time has kept

1) Bulwer, " Palmerston " Vol. II, p. 309.

the Turkish Empire in a state of civil war." ¹ Mr. Fector declared " I will tell the noble lord that the main cause of any distress which may exist in Egypt, arises from his policy;" ² and so ~~am~~ the praise of Mehemet Ali and the criticism of the policy of the foreign secretary was expressed on all sides. Thiers, assured of England's antagonism towards his protégé, decided to set out on a course by himself and settle the question alone. He made various proposals both at Constantinople and at Alexandria but with little success. The Powers on discovering this underhanded policy of France violently denounced it as a violation of the note of July 27, 1839 which France had signed.*

Meanwhile the differences between Russia and England having been obviated by the Czar's willingness to let the treaty of Unkiar Skælessi lapse, a definite alliance between these two powers seemed certain. Palmerston had been informed by Col. Hodges who had succeeded Col. Campbell at Alexandria, that Mehemet Ali was weakening. So he resolved to enter into final arrangement with Russia. Austria and Prussia showed their willingness to join, and on July 15,

1840, a protocol was agreed to. ³ The provisions of this

*) Bulwer says in his " Life of Palmerston " - " M. Thiers saw no other escape from his difficulties then to bring about an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali which would strip all other governments but that of France of the pretensions to be the Sultan's protector. Vol. II p. 14

1) Hansard; " Parliamentary Debates " Vol., 53, p. 182.

2) Ibid p. 198.

3) The reprint of this treaty may be found in " British State and Foreign Papers," Vol. XXVIII, p. 342; Bulwer, " Palmerston " Vol II, p. 424; and Noradounghian, " Actes Internationaux etc. " Vol. II, No. 104.

were:

1. Their Majesties engaged themselves to act in perfect accord and to unite their efforts in order to compel Mehemet Ali to observe their arrangement.
2. If Mehemet Ali were to refuse, they were on the request of the Sultan to intercept the communication by sea of Egypt with Syria and prevent the transportation of troops, horses, etc.
3. That they would take concerted action in defending Constantinople.
4. That the above case was exceptional . . At other times no foreign war vessel was to be admitted into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles.

The settlement of the Egyptian question was arranged in separate articles which were:

1. " Their Highnesses promised to grant to Mehemet Ali, for him and for his descendents in direct line, the administration of the Pashalik of Egypt; and Their Highnesses promised furthermore to grant to Mehemet Ali during his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of the fortress of St. Jean d' Acre, the administration of the meridional part of Syria of which the limits were afterwards to be determined." If at the end of ten days after the notification, Mehemet Ali had not withdrawn his troops

from Arabia, the Holy Land, the Isle of Candia, Adana, etc. the Sultan's offer of Syria and Acre was to be withdrawn.

2. If Mehemet Ali had not accepted in ten days more, the whole offer of the Sultan was to be withdrawn.
3. The annual tribute was to depend on how soon the Pasha would submit.
4. The Turkish fleet was to be returned by Mehemet Ali.
5. The laws of the Ottoman Empire were to apply to Egypt, Acre, etc. as in any other provinces.
6. The forces of Mehemet Ali were to belong to the service of the state.

France was not a party to this agreement.* She now devoted all her efforts to defeat its provisions.¹ Thus Palmerston wrote to Bulwer September 4th, 1840 - " You will well have heard from Appony of the outrageous language held by Pontois to the Porte and of the threats made by

him, that if the Sultan ratifies the treaty, France will

*) France felt deeply insulted at not having been formally requested to join the alliance. Thus the King of the Belgians wrote to Queen Victoria July 26th 1840, -

" The mode in this affair ought to have been, as soon as the foreign powers had agreed on a proposition, to communicate it officially to France, to join it. France had but two ways, either to join or to refuse its adhesion. If it had chosen the last it would have been a free decision on her part, and a secession which had nothing offensive in the eyes of the nation. But there is a material difference between leaving a company from motives of one's own, or being kicked out of it." " Letters of Queen Victoria," Vol. I, p. 287.

1) De Testa, " Traités " Vol. III, p. 12.

assist Mehemet Ali and attack the four Powers." ¹ Backed by France, Mehemet Ali refused to accept the conditions imposed by the note of July 15th. The allies consequently began a system of coercion. On August 11th Sir Charles Napier appeared off Beirut and ordered it to surrender. Suliman Pasha who was protecting the place refused and the bombardment commenced. On September 13th Mehemet Ali was officially deposed by the Sultán.

France could not remain quiet while her protégée was being openly attacked by the forces of the four great Powers. The public sentiment of France favored war on Mehemet's behalf.* Thus Croker wrote to the King of Hanover² -

" Your Majesty can have no conception of the absurdity into which all classes of French have plunged themselves upon the Eastern question. To listen to the talk of the salons and cafés there must be war; and for what object? To prevent the partition of Turkey which it seems England meditates." On September 22nd Palmerston wrote Bulwer that,

" if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse

*) The French people were aroused against England for other reasons also. Thus Louis Philippe wrote to the King of the Belgians October 2, 1840 - " La fureur contre l'Angleterre s'accroît et un des points que je regrette le plus, c'est que tout notre peuple est persuadé que l'Angleterre veut réduire la France au rang de Puissance secondaire, et vous savez se que c'est que l'orgueil national et la vanité de tous les peuples." " Letters of Queen Victoria," Vol. I, O. 295.

1) Bulwer, " Palmerston " Vol. II, p. 322.

2) Croker Papers, Vol. II, p. 364.

to pick it up." ¹ On October 8th 1840, Thiers notified England that " France was disposed to take part in any admissible arrangement that should be based on the double guarantee of the existence of the Sultan and the Viceroy of Egypt but could not consent to the execution of the decree of forfeiture pronounced against Mehemet Ali on September 14th at Constantinople." ² On October 15th England instructed Ponsonby to recommend to the Porte in conjunction with Russia, Prussia and Austria, the restoration to Mehemet Ali of the Pashalik of Egypt. ³ But France was still unsatisfied and Thiers threatened to declare war unless England changed her position. Palmerston refused outright; but Thiers instead of declaring war was forced to resign by the peaceful attitude of Louis Philippe * who would not sanction Theirs' war schemes. Peace now seemed assured.

Meanwhile Mehemet Ali was being crushed by the allies. At the renewed outbreak of hostilities the Egyptian forces numbered 250,000. ⁴ They were occupying the strategic posi-

*) In his speech to the Chamber on November 5th 1840 Louis Philippe said among other things,- " I continue to hope for general peace. It is necessary for the common interest of Europe, for the welfare of all the people and for the progress of civilization. I count upon you to aid me in maintaining it." De Testa, " Traits " Vol. III, p. 15.

1) Bulwer, " Palmerston " Vol. II, p. 327

2) Guizot " Memoirs " p. 43.

3) Ibid p. 44.

4) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 187.

tions of Syria. The Pasha however, was now somewhat afraid of an insurrection and he therefore issued three proclamations, declaring that the French were going to send him aid, that he was fighting for Mohammedanism and warning the Maronites that England being an anti-catholic nation would support the Druzes in case the allies occupied Syria.¹ But his decrees failed in their purpose for the Syrians rose in revolt as soon as they were assured of foreign aid. The Syrians for a long time had been stirred up by English agents. Thus Dr. Bowring said in the House of Commons September 20 th 1841,² " we had stimulated the Syrians to revolt against Mehemet Ali; we had held them to splendid promises. As long ago as 1836 Lord Ponsonby had sent a subordinate official of the Constantinople embassy, a Levantine, to sow the seeds of discontent and insurrection; and he had been rewarded by the consulship of Damascus. This gentlemen (Mr. Wood) returned again when it was decided by the four Powers to eject Mehemet Ali from Syria, and Lord Ponsonby thus instructed him August 4th 1840, ' I direct you to declare in my name loudly to whoever chooses to hear you, that I am authorized to acquaint the Syrians that the British government in union with the governments of Austria, Russia and Prussia will protect the Syrians who shall return to the direct

1) Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century " p. 187.
 2) Hansard, " Parliamentary Debates " Vol 59, p. 629.

obedience of the Sultan! " Palmerston in response declared that the Syrians had never left the allegiance of the Porte and that they consequently were not in revolt.¹ The fact remains that the rebellion rapidly spread and Ibrahim was forced to abandon the northern part of Syria. The allies gained city after city and on November 3rd Acre was surrendered. France was more surprised than any other power over the sudden collapse of the power of Mehemet Ali. * The Pasha seeing himself crushed begged France to make for him the best possible terms.² But France now could do little.

On November 21st Commodore Napier appeared before Alexandria and on the next day promised to secure the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet provided he would restore the Turkish fleet, return the prisoners of war and withdraw his troops from Syria. The Pasha responded that he was willing to give up the fleet as soon as the Turkish government should send the proper officials to receive it.³ As to the other two points he consented but added that it would require sometime before they could be entirely fulfilled. On November 25th Napier had a personal

*) Palmerston wrote to Granville November 29, 1840, - " Was there ever so complete a delusion practiced upon human credulity as that which the French have so long played upon mankind, about the power and the resources of Mehemet Ali in Syria and Egypt?" Bulwer, " Palmerston " Vol. II, p. 352.

1) Hansard, " Parliamentary Debates " Vol. 59, p. 634.

2) Bulwer, " Palmerston " Vol. II, p. 345. Digitized by Google

3) Prokesch-Osten, " Mehmed Ali " p. 188.

interview with Mehemet Ali and induced him to sign a convention containing practically the terms agreed to on November 21st.¹

The Porte immediately repudiated the convention probably at the instigation of Ponsonby.² Palmerston however, ratified it and the other Powers quickly followed. Metternich even went so far as to declare that in case the Porte continued her unfavorable attitude towards the Napier convention, Austria would be obliged to take sides with Mehemet Ali.³ On December 6th Admiral Stopford officially notified Mehemet that the allies would adhere to Napier's arrangement providing he would return the fleet and begin the evacuation of Syria within three days.⁴ Mehemet accepted these conditions and the Eastern question of 1840 reached its last stage. In the early part of January 1841 after having fulfilled the conditions of the convention, Mehemet Ali announced his complete submission to the

Sultan.* On January 10th the four allied Powers presented

 *) The letter of submission written to Khusrev was as follows: " Thus then when your Highness shall, please God have taken note of my prompt submission, you will lay it at the pity of my august and powerful sovereign, of whom I am so proud to be the faithful servant; and you will employ your good offices in order to cause a man advanced in age and faithful, who has grown old in service, to experience without ceasing the effects of his master's clemency." Cameron, " Egypt in the 19th Century, p. 196.

1) Bulwer, " Palmerston " Vol. II, p. 431.

2) Guizot, " Memoirs " p. 58.

3) Ibid p. 61

4) Prokesch-Osten, " Mehmed Ali " p. 170.

a note to the Sultan requiring him to accept the Napier convention; and finally on February 13th 1841 the Sultan proclaimed the investiture of Mehemet Ali.¹ On February 20, 1841, the firman was presented to the Pasha; but the terms^{of} investiture were not at all agreeable to him and he rejected them.² Among other conditions which the Porte laid down were: the right of choosing the hereditary successor of Mehemet Ali from his children, thus denying primogeniture; and the right of appointment by the Sultan of the officers of the Egyptian army above the rank of lieutenant-colonel.³ This interpretation of the hereditary clause was objectionable also to the German Powers,⁴ who feared that the Eastern question which had been "irrevocably" settled so often was still very much unsettled. Palmerston also adopted this view and in March 1841 instructed Ponsonby in conjunction with the allies to urge the Porte to modify the provisions of the firman of February 13th.⁵ The Sultan complied and finally on June 10th the Viceroy in his turn accepted the new propositions of the Porte, and peace was restored.* The final settlement contained the following provisions:

— 1. All laws made for the Ottoman Empire were also to —

*) The new firman replacing that of February 13th was issued May 23, 1841.

1) Noradounghian, "Actes Internationaux etc." Vol. II, No. 110

2) The letter is printed in Cadalvene et Barrault, Vol. II, 385

3) Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique "Vol. I, p. 294.

4) Ibid

5) Noradounghian, "Actes Internationaux etc." Vol. II, No. 116.

apply to Egypt.

2. The Pashas of Egypt were to hold the same rank as other similar officials of the Empire.
3. One fourth of the revenues collected in the name of Sultan was to be paid to the central government.
4. In times of peace the Pasha's troops were not to exceed 18,000
5. The troops of the Pasha were to be a part of the Ottoman army.
6. The Pashalik of Egypt was conferred on Mehemet Ali and his heirs in direct line.
7. Mehemet was to administer during his life the governments, of Nubia, Khordofan, Sennaar and Darfour.

Although the Eastern question was finally settled in the East, it was still not settled in the West. France was injured by the fact that the Quadruple Alliance had acted in the great Eastern problem without her consent. Guizot however, tried to bring France back into the European concert.* Thus Guizot proposed that the five Powers guarantee the integrity of Turkey, but Palmerston objected. Instead of this the four Powers signed with Turkey a " Protocol of

*) The Cabinet of the 29th October was selected with the ideas of maintaining peace among the Powers. On the eighteenth of November Guizot boldly addressed the Chamber of Deputies expressing his satisfaction that the country had not been burdened by a rash and unjust war, and defending the attitude of the Quadruple Alliance in the Eastern question of this date. Prokesch-Osten " Mehmed Ali " p. 170.

Closure " ¹ on July 10th 1841 in which the signatory Powers agreed to observe the custom of the closure of the Dardanelles to warships. On July 13th the five great Powers signed the " Protocol of the Straits " which pledged the Powers to observe the rule restricting the navigation of the Dardanelles to merchants of pleasure ships.² Thus the concert of Europe was restored and the Eastern question was closed for a decade.

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- 1) Noradounghian, " Actes Internationaux etc. " Vol.II, No.122.
 2) British State and Foreign Papers, Vol. XXIX, p. 703.

CONCLUSION

To draw conclusions as to what would have been or would not have been the results had a different course been pursued in an historical question is usually a very dangerous thing. In the subject under discussion the question as to how and to what extent European history would have been changed had Mehemet Ali instead of Abdul Mejid occupied the throne at Constantinople, the danger of going astray is minimized for several reasons. First we have Egypt as an example of what Mehemet Ali could and would do in a country of which he was master. Second we have the unmistakable attitude of Europe as regards the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. These two facts give an apparently sound basis from which conclusions may be drawn.

" Mehemet Ali would have been the man to give to Turkey a new life and it is a misfortune that we did not conceive of it in time." ¹ These were the words used by Napier in concluding his arrangement with Mehemet Ali. Many historians have agreed with him in his estimate of Mehemet's ability. That the Pasha of Egypt as Sultan, would have given Turkey a better government, would have maintained order in the provinces, would have lifted the Ottoman

1) Prokesch-Osten, " Mehemed Ali " p. 170. Digitized by Google

Empire out of an almost bankrupt condition and established a strong centralized government, there can be little doubt, judging from his work in Egypt. But that the Ottoman Empire could have been kept from falling back to its old condition of anarchy after its regenerator had passed away is questionable. While Mehemet Ali lived and was at its helm it probably would have remained strong, but his powerful support once removed would it not have followed the same course that Egypt has taken? Of course the whole of Turkey would not have been a protectorate of England or France or any other government, ^{is} as Egypt ~~has done~~, because of Europe's opposition to any dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire; but as for other results would not the analogy between Egypt and hypothetical Turkey under Mehemet hold good? Nevertheless to say that ultimately there would have been no change in the political condition of the Ottoman Empire is not to say that Mehemet's administration would have been without results. Economically, socially, and religiously many reforms would doubtless have been instituted and Turkey temporarily would have stood on a stronger basis. Would Mehemet have permitted any conditions to arise which would have ^{given} Europe an opportunity to interfere? Would he not have prevented or at least have made less formidable by a strong centralized government any insurrection which might have arisen? Knowing the attitude of Europe regard-

ing persecutions and massacres of Christians and granting to him the shrewd diplomatic ability and statesmanship with which he is usually credited, would he have permitted such conditions to continue after complaints and threats had been made by Europe? Would he have pursued the vacillatory, hesitating and hypocritical policy towards France and Russia in regard to the Holy Places that was one of the causes of the Crimean War; or would he even have allowed that question to pass out of his hands?

That the Powers looked on Mehemet Ali with more respect than they did on Abdul Mejid is certain. Then would not this respect mixed with a touch of jealousy and fear, have been shown to him at Constantinople as it had been at Alexandria? If we believe in Mehemet's genius, if we believe in the goodness and sincerity of his intentions regarding the reformation and reconstruction of the Ottoman Empire, if we measure what he might have done as Sultan by what he did as Pasha, we must conclude that there would have been no Crimean War. That his influence, that his labors would not have been sufficient to keep Turkey after his death in the position which he would have placed her, is reasonable to believe when we look at Egypt. Nevertheless his reign would have given to Turkey new vigor and would have obviated many of the complex problems that arose under later Sultans.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL COMMENTS

Although there is a fairly large amount of material in existence bearing, directly or indirectly, upon the relations of Mehemet Ali to Europe, the available references in the English language are few or of little historical value because of inaccuracy of statement or prejudice of view. That is not to say that the French, Austrian or German historians of this period have mastered the weakness of self pride or patriotism as it is often called, or temporarily set aside the temptation of exalting themselves and their nation at the expense of others, but rather that the English works do not show as thorough a scholarship, as patient and careful a research, and as great a willingness to sacrifice glory for the preservation of truth, as those of their continental neighbors. The French works contain by far the best treatment of the subject, both as a whole and in detail. The Germans have not written much along this line but what they have done is done carefully and impartially.

There are very few general histories that have satisfactory accounts of our subject. Most of them ignore completely the existence of Mehemet Ali or else neglect the Egyptian question of 1840, only recognizing vaguely that

there WAS a question of this sort. We have however, some very good chapters in a few of our general histories. Among these are chapters V and XXVI by M. A. Debidour in volume X of Lavissee et Rambaud. Chapters VI (Greece) and XVII (Mehemet Ali) by W. Alison Philips in volume X of the "Cambridge Modern History" are commendable. Theodore Flath has an interesting account of the diplomatic struggle over the Greek question in Chapter III of volume XVIII of the "History of All Nations". Fyffe's treatment of the subject in his "History of Modern Europe" is well written and suggestive.

The source material consists of course, of the "British State and Foreign Papers," Hansard's "Debates," the "Annual Register," the "Annuaire Historique Universel", the diplomatic despatches, treaties, newspaper and periodical accounts, and letters. The compilations of Norddoughian and De Testa contain all the important treaties and papers of the Ottoman Empire for this period, as far as they are published at all. Martens' and Neumann's works are veritable store-houses of the important documents of Russia and Austria respectively. Bulwer's "Palmerston" has much valuable material but smacks too much of Bulwer himself. Metternich's and Guizot's "Memoirs" are indispensable for a careful study. Benson's "Letters of Queen Victoria" contain a great deal of information bearing

on the Eastern Question.

Most of the works on Napoleon's Egyptian's campaign bring out the traditional French attitude regarding Egypt. A. L. P. Dennis brings out this point in the third chapter of his " Eastern Problems." Fournier in "Napoleon I " traces the development of this tradition from its inception to 1798.

Most of the books on the Ottoman Empire take up in detail the subject of Egypt's relation with Europe. Of these, Zinkeissen's account as far as it goes (1812) is very satisfactory. Dr. G. Rosen, Jusserau de St Denis and Jonquière have interesting narratives Prokesch-Osten, Dicey, Cameron and Paton take the Egyptian side of the question. Paton's second volume is probably as good a narrative as any we have in English covering the reign of Mehemet Ali. Milner and Cromer discuss the subject after the establishment of the English "protectorate" and emphasize the economic aspects.

The material on the Greek Revolution is abundant. We must not however, accept unhesitatingly the contemporary narratives of the struggle, which are usually discolored by European sympathy.. Gordon's and Finlay's accounts are usually reliable. Sergeant's work is later and has a good arrangement. "Geschichte Griechenlands ." by Karl Mendelsohn Bartholdy seems to be the most satisfactory.

For the social conditions and problems of Turkey the accounts of Edson Clark, Adolphus Slade, and Mrs. John Blunt are valuable. Freeman shows the inherent and primary causes of the unrest of the Ottoman Empire. Hogarth's "The Nearer East " is an accurate and careful work on the physiographic and ethnologic conditions of the Empire. Yates gives a detailed account of the economic and social conditions of Egypt during this period. Russell describes Egypt in 1834. English's " Report " of the expedition to Dongola and Senaar establishes the truth regarding the charges against Mehemet Ali in ^{reference to} his slave hunting expeditions.

Finally, we have the various diplomatic histories dealing with Eastern problems in general, or with the Egyptian question in particular. We must be careful in reading these to make allowances for the nationality and political affiliations of the author. The French again rank first in the number of productions of this class. Debidour, Gaignerot, Eadalvene et Barroult, Brehier, and Benedetti, all have made valuable contributions. Prokesch-Osten's "Mehmed Ali" contains much information. Malortie's account of the diplomatic struggle is rather one-sided. He is too great an admirer of the Egyptian Pasha to forego prejudice in his favor.

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